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The offshore oil and gas industry functions in a team work culture in which operations 
depend not only on individuals’ competency, but also on team skills. Team skills are even 
more necessary when it comes to handling emergency conditions. Emergency conditions 
are dynamic in nature and personnel on board are challenged with evolving high-risk 
situations, time pressure, and uncertainty. One way to effectively handle emergencies is to 
train personnel to a competency level, both individually and as a part of a team. This would 
increase the chance of achieving safety in a timely manner using the available resources 
such as information, equipment, and people. Such training involves enhancing team 
members' understanding of human performance, in particular, the social and cognitive 
aspects of effective teamwork and good decision making. Post-accident analysis of offshore 
accidents shows that conventional training programs are often too generic, and that they 
are not designed to identify and tackle the human factors that are critical for evolving 
offshore emergency situations. 
 
Recognition of the importance of human factors on operator performance raises the need 
for training that goes beyond conventional training programs and incorporates non-
technical training focusing on leadership, command, decision making, communication, and 
teamwork. A major difficulty to design such training is that it involves practicing 
emergency exercises with a potentially large number of participants, each playing the 
appropriate role in a given scenario. Such large-scale team exercises suffer from both 
organizational and educational drawbacks. The amount of human and financial resources 
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needed for such a training exercise is difficult to organize. Furthermore, it is very hard, if 
not impossible, to get all team members together at the same time and location. Also, the 
team members may have variability in the competency levels (novice versus advanced 
trainees) and hence different training needs. One effective and flexible solution to this 
problem is to use intelligent artificial agents, or ‘virtual workers’, in a virtual environment 
(VE) to play different roles in the team. Virtual workers are artificially intelligent agents 
that can reproduce behaviors that are similar to or compatible with those of a real worker. 
This research proposes to develop a human behavior simulation model (HBM) that can be 
used to create such virtual workers in the context of offshore emergency egress.  
 
The goal of this research is to develop a human behavior model that can simulate offshore 
workers’ emergency response under the influence of performance influencing factors 
(PIFs). The first part of the work focuses on understanding human behavior during offshore 
emergency situations. A two level, three factor experiment was conducted in a virtual 
environment (VE) to investigate the relationships between the PIFs and human behavior. 
Influence of both internal and external PIFs were investigated. Knowledge acquisition and 
inference processes of individuals were also investigated in the experimental study. In the 
second part, a computational model was developed to capture the across-subject variability 
observed during the experiment. Interviews with subject matter experts (SME) were 
conducted at this step to ensure that the model is able to produce a realistic range of human 
behaviors. The final step was to validate the developed behavior model. All high-level tasks 
to validate the HBM were performed. Special emphasis was given on acceptability criteria 
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1.1 Problem statement 
The offshore oil and gas industry functions in a team work culture and operations usually 
involve a group of people working together. This makes teamwork an essential component 
of effective emergency responses. Members of a team need to understand their own roles 
and responsibilities, as well as have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities 
of the other team members. Such understanding is critical for emergency situations, as most 
of the members will have different roles and responsibilities than their everyday duties 
(Flin, 1997). Traditional training programs are often generic and are not designed to provide 
trainees with the understanding of social and cognitive aspects of effective team work. 
 
O'Connor & Flin (2003) discuss the possibility of adopting the crew resource management 
technique, pioneered in the aviation industry, in offshore oil industries to enhance team 
performance. Crew resource management (CRM) is defined as “using all the available 
resources – information, equipment, and people – to achieve safe and efficient flight 
operations” (Moffat & Crichton, 2015). A significant part of the CRM training requires the 
trainees to participate in team training exercises using simulator flights. Organizing such 
team exercises for offshore industries may suffer from both organizational and educational 
drawbacks (Van Diggelen et al., 2010). Gathering all the team members at the same time 
and at the same location itself is a challenge. Even when it is possible, the financial 




competency levels. One solution to this problem is to develop a team training platform in 
a simulator where the roles of some of members are played by humans, while roles of others 
are played by artificial intelligent agents (Van Diggelen et al., 2010). This research aims to 
develop computational behavior simulation models that can be used to create such 
intelligent agents for an offshore emergency training simulator. 
 
The purpose of the behavior simulation model is to reproduce the behavior of offshore 
workers, general personnel in particular, during offshore emergency situations. Compared 
to traditional human behavior models, the proposed model considers a larger fraction of the 
possible behavior space, which includes both correct and incorrect behaviors (Wray & 
Laird, 2003). To model the variability across behavior space, performance influencing 
factors (PIFs) are used in this research. PIFs are factors that can specifically decrement or 
improve human performance during a task (Blackman et al., 2008).  In the first part of the 
work, emphasis is given to understanding human behavior variability during offshore 
emergency situations. A two-level, three factor experiment is conducted in a virtual 
environment (VE) to observe the influence of different PIFs on human emergency 
responses. The influence of both internal and external PIFs is investigated during the 
experiment. Knowledge acquisition and inference of individuals are also investigated in the 
experiment. In the second part of the research, a computational model is developed that 
capture the observed variability and are able to produce realistic human behavior. Finally, 
a validation experiment is designed and conducted to make sure that the model can simulate 




The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. As the experimental study and data 
collection in this research is centered around a VE for offshore emergency preparedness 
training, an introduction to the VE is presented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 summarizes the 
works currently available in the behavior modeling domain, and identifies the knowledge 
and technological gaps. Section 1.4 defines the scope of work and objectives. Section 1.5 
discusses approaches taken in this research to overcome the identified gaps. It also lists the 
novelty and expected contribution of the research. Section 1.6 presents the organization of 
the thesis. 
1.2 Overview of the virtual environment (VE) 
A VE is a computer aided simulation environment that allows trainees to gain artificial 
experience, including in dangerous scenarios. VE training can act as an enhancement to 
conventional training since training for emergency situations in the real world is not always 
ethically, logistically or financially feasible (Veitch et al., 2008). Besides facilitating 
emergency preparedness training, VE can also be used as a tool to observe human 
performance in emergency conditions and collect data for assessing human reliability (Lois 
et al., 2009; Bye et al., 2011; Monferini et al., 2013). The VE used in the experimental 
study done in this research is called the all-hands virtual emergency response trainer 
(AVERT) and was developed at Memorial University. AVERT was designed to enhance 
offshore emergency response training. The VE is modeled after an offshore oil installation 
platform with high levels of detail. It is capable of creating credible emergency scenarios 
by introducing hazards such as blackouts, fires, and explosions. For the experimental study 




from muster drills that required the participant to go to their primary muster station, to more 
complex emergency evacuation scenarios that required the participant to avoid hazards 
blocking their egress routes and muster at their lifeboat stations (House et al., 2014). Figure 
1.1 shows a few instances of the AVERT emergency preparedness scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Screen capture of the virtual training environment - AVERT 
1.3 Knowledge and technological gaps 
Software agents, or computer generated forces (CGFs), are extensively used in a wide range 
of military applications, including training and rehearsal for combat situations (Karr et al., 
1997). The use of virtual crew is also common in aviation and nuclear power plant 
simulation training (Chang & Mosleh, 2007a). Realism of agents in any platform largely 




(Smith, 1998). This is why a significant amount of research has been done to develop 
computational models that can generate realistic human behavior. 
 
Models of human behavior treat the human as a dynamic system that reacts to observed 
input from the environment (Huitt, 2009). Behavior simulation models can be qualitative 
or quantitative. Qualitative models focus on describing the evolution of the human 
cognition process upon receiving an external stimulus from the environment. This involves 
details of the cognitive functions – perception, interpretation, decision making, and 
execution (Thow-Yick, 1994; Trucco & Leva, 2007). Quantitative models are based on the 
structure of the qualitative ones, but have added computational functionalities. Quantitative 
models can probabilistically predict human response for a given circumstance.  
 
Operator plant simulation (OPSIM), Cognitive Environment Simulation (CES), Cognitive 
Simulation Model (COSIMO), Information, Decision, and Action in Crew context (IDAC) 
are all examples of quantitative behavior models for nuclear power plant simulation. 
OPSIM models operator behavior and identifies possible human errors that might happen 
while following procedural instructions, but the probability of erroneous behavior is not 
incorporated in the model (Dang, 1996).  CES and COSIMO aim to estimate operator 
behavior during power plant emergencies (Woods, 1987 and Cacciabue et al., 1992). CES 
uses a data base that represents operator knowledge. The content of the database, and the 
relationships between different knowledge units, are specified by knowledge engineers 




artificial intelligence techniques that link various segments of the data base for a given 
situation. COSIMO shares the concept of using a data base to represent operator 
knowledge. However, the cognitive architecture is based on a stronger theoretical ground 
– the Fallible Machine model by Reason (1990). The cognitive architecture consists of two 
parts: the working memory and the knowledge base. The knowledge base is a virtually 
limitless repository of information that contains both declarative and procedural knowledge 
structures. The working memory is a limited, serial working area, and is the temporary 
storage of data required by the cognitive process. COSIMO focuses on the two 
fundamentals of cognition - similarity matching, and frequency gambling. During the 
similarity matching stage, attribute values of a given situation are compared to attribute 
values stored in the data base to find a match. If there is a conflict (i.e. more than one match 
found for the given situation), frequency gambling is used for conflict resolution by 
favoring the match that occurs most frequently. COSIMO also introduces the concept of 
using behavioral moderators to encode variability in the generated behavior. It does not 
include details on the behavioral moderator selection process, or the relationship between 
a moderator and human behavior. IDAC introduces the foundation of using PIFs as 
behavioral moderators (Chang & Mosleh, 2007b). In IDAC, operators’ behaviors are 
probabilistically simulated under the influence of a number of explicitly modeled PIFs. 
Special attention has been paid to identify external, internal, static, and dynamic PIFs 
relevant to nuclear power plant accident scenarios. A set of rules-of-behavior is then 
developed that take the PIFs as input and generate behavior as output. As suggested by the 




methodology, but need further revisions for realistic and justifiable modeling (Chang & 
Mosleh, 2007c). 
 
TacAir-Soar, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Air-to-Ground Linked 
Environment Simulation (EAAGLES), and AvatarSim are examples of military and air 
craft simulations that have made significant contribution to the development of realistic 
HBMs. TacAir-Soar is a model of expert human pilots flying tactical air mission (Jones et 
al., 1999). MOUT is an urban combat simulation used for building-clearing combat training 
(Sampson & Ripingill Jr, 2003). In a MOUT simulation, agents are used as both command 
team mates and opponents and are known as MOUTBots. Both TacAir-Soar and 
MOUTBots use the Soar architecture for cognition (Wray & Laird, 2003). The basic units 
of knowledge in Soar are production rules. These rules are used for defining goals and 
proposing, selecting, and applying actions for a given situation. Rules are collected from 
interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) and are put in the knowledge base prior to 
simulation. TacAir-Soar focuses only on rules that generate correct behavior and ignores 
the possibility of erroneous behavior. MOUT offers incorporation of some erroneous 
behavior through behavioral moderators, but does not provide a reliable mathematical 
model that defines the relationship between the behavioral moderators and the choice of 
production rules. EAAGLES incorporate two mental models – the Situational Assessment 
Model of Pilot in the Loop Evaluation (SAMPLE) and Soar – to represent realistic combat 
behavior. Though different qualitative aspects of EAAGLES have been discussed in the 




AvatarSim models and simulates human behavior in aircraft evacuations (Sharma, 2009). 
It uses psychological, environmental, and physical parameters that are natural in emergency 
evacuations. The psychological factors include stress, anger, and panic. Smoke, terrain, and 
smoothness are considered in the environmental category. Visibility, agility, and fitness are 
included as physical parameters. To model the uncertainty in behavior that results from the 
behavioral parameters, a fuzzy logic approach is used (i.e. IF Stress is of high intensity 
THEN speed is slow). Even though the use of behavioral parameters makes responses of 
AvatarSim naturalistic, it is limited in the sense that it only focuses on the effect of the 
parameters on agents’ speed and wait time. It does not consider a broader range of behaviors 
that might be observed in real life emergency situations. 
 
Once an HBM is developed, it needs to be validated to ensure that the model represents 
human behavior accurately. Compared to physics based simulation models, validating 
HBMs is much more difficult. Human behavior is complex and depends on a large number 
of PIFs. The PIFs can vary over many orders of magnitude and can have highly complex 
dependency relationships. Even small situation changes within the same system may cause 
different human responses. This makes HBM validation extremely difficult since the 
validation would require the exploration of a very large number of behavioral paths. 
Balancing the variability and the validation is identified as one of the most challenging 





Because of the difficulty, so far, the most common validation technique for HBM is face 
validation (Goerger, 2004). In the face validation technique, an SME drives through the 
scenario space by issuing commands or changing the simulating situation, observes the 
resulting behavior, and determines, often qualitatively, whether the simulation meets a 
user’s requirements for realism. Despite its wide application, Recommended Practices 
Guide on Validation of Human Behavior Representations (2001), describes face validation 
as the least reliable and least complete HBM validation. It discusses that, most of the time, 
SMEs’ judgments are drawn from their own experience and can be biased. Face validation 
raises the possibility of conflict among multiple SMEs. It is also hard to ensure the level of 
consistency and accuracy of SMEs when evaluating human performance versus simulated 
human behavior.  
 
Based on the literature review, following gaps between the existing methods and 
requirements are identified. 
• Though extensive research has been done to develop HBMs for creating artificial 
intelligent agents in military applications, the aviation industry, and nuclear power 
plants, no such model is available to date for offshore emergency training simulators. 
• Many HBMs focus only on the ideal human behavior and hence the success region of 
the total behavior space (McNally, 2005). 
• HBMs that take erroneous behavior into consideration often lack a reliable modeling 
approach. Models often do not account for the potential dependencies among different 




using SMEs’ opinions. Expert judgment can be vague and suffer from uncertainty, 
incomplete knowledge, and conflicts between multiple experts.  Also, use of expert 
opinion relies on the underlying assumption that the PIFs affect all individuals in the 
same way (Joea & Boringa, 2014). Thus, expert opinion fails to account for the inherent 
variability in human nature. 
• In most HBM systems, knowledge placed in the knowledge base is derived from 
interviews with SMEs. This fails to capture the variability in human learning and 
inference processes. Given the same training, people may learn and infer things 
differently and can have different approaches to solve the same problem.  
• Though significant research is available on the development of HBMs, work done to 
validate the models is rare. A few attempts to validate HBMs use SMEs as referents 
(Harmon et al., 2002). Referent refers to a codified body of knowledge about a thing 
being simulated (Recommended practice guide (RPG): Special Topic - Validation of 
Human Behavior Representations, 2001). During validation, a referent provides the 
information to which the simulation outcomes are compared. As stated above, using 
SMEs as referents can make the validation biased and inconsistent. 
1.4 Scope of work and objectives 
The primary goal of this research is to develop HBMs that can simulate the behavior of 
offshore workers under the influence of different PIFs that are present in emergency 





The first part focuses on understanding human behavior by observing people’s performance 
in a VE. External PIFs that can influence people’s performance during offshore emergency 
conditions were first selected. Credible emergency scenarios were then designed in the VE 
by varying the selected PIFs into different levels. An experiment was conducted to observe 
people’s performance in the scenarios and collect human performance data. The collected 
data were divided into training and testing data sets. Figure 1.2 summarizes the purpose of 
the data sets. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Use of training and testing data sets 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2, in the second part of the research, the training data set was used to 
develop an integrated HBM to reproduce the behavior of a general personnel. First, the 
basic task sequence of offshore general personnel was identified. Four types of cognitive 
tasks were considered during the task analysis – perception, interpretation, decision 
making, and execution (Edwards & Lees, 1974). Errors can happen while performing any 
of these tasks (Rasmussen, 1976). The probability of such error depends on the state of 




to model the impact of PIFs on human error. The training data set was used to quantify the 
BN model. Evidence collected during the experiment was also used to model the 
memorized information. The knowledge individuals gained from the training tutorials and 
scenarios was presented in the form of a knowledge matrix. An inductive reasoning 
algorithm – decision tree – was then used to identify the general principles or problem-
solving strategies based on the individual cases in the knowledge matrix. The knowledge 
matrix and the decision trees together define the memorized information. 
 
The third part of the research is focused on validating the HBMs using the testing data set. 
As listed in Defense Modeling and Simulation Office's (DMSO) Recommended Practices 
Guide (RPG), any HBM validation process needs to perform a few high-level tasks. The 
first task was to collect a set of requirements and acceptability criteria that set the 
foundation of the validation. Next, referents were to be identified to assess the credibility 
of the HBM. As mentioned earlier, both SMEs and empirical evidence were used as 
referents during the validation process. The conceptual model and the knowledge base were 
then validated using the referents and the defined requirements. During the validation of 
the conceptual model and the knowledge base, complex behavior areas of the model were 
identified for future validation activities. The final step was to validate the integrated HBM 
model using referents and requirements. This is called result validation and involves 
acceptability criteria testing by exercising testing scenarios to ensure that the integrated 
HBM performs adequately under different operating conditions. To perform this step, the 




personnel. The complex areas identified in the previous step were used at the result 
validation step to design credible test scenarios.  
 
Having the above scope of work, the objectives and associated tasks of this research can be 
listed as shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
 






1.5 Novelty and contribution 
This research attempts to overcome the gaps identified in Section 1.3 by taking the 
following steps: 
• In this research, HBMs representing behavior of offshore workers during emergencies 
are developed. The goal of the research is to develop HBMs that can reproduce realistic 
human behavior for general personnel working offshore. To make the behavior 
naturalistic, both successful and erroneous behaviors are considered. The behavior 
paths generated by the HBM represent both success and failure regions of the total 
behavior space. Variability in behavior is encoded using internal and external PIFs. 
• To model the effect of PIFs on human behavior, a BN approach is used. BNs have 
proven to be a powerful modeling tool due to their capability to 1) consider dependency 
among PIFs and associated actions, 2) quantify the impact of different PIFs on 
successful or erroneous behavior, and 3) update success or failure likelihood each time 
new evidence is available (Fenton & Neil, 2012; Podofillini & Dang, 2013; 
Sundaramurthi & Smidts, 2013). BNs have been widely used to model the impact of 
different PIFs on human performance or human error (Baraldi, et al., 2009; Dang & 
Stempfel, 2012). Kim & Seong (2006), Cai et al. (2013) and Martins & Maturana 
(2013) show examples of using the evidential reasoning aspect of BN to find the 
underlying causes of human error. Also, the BN model allows the incorporation of 
multiple sources of data into a single predictive HRA model (Groth & Mosleh, 2012). 




emergency situations. Instead of using expert judgement, data required to quantify BNs 
are collected by conducting experiments in the virtual environment AVERT. 
• This research acknowledges the fact that unlike machines, each human is different. 
Effects of different PIFs can vary from individual to individual. The virtual 
experimental data collection technique enables the consideration of individual 
differences while assessing and modeling people’s success or failure likelihood. 
• Special attention has been paid in this research to model the decision making of general 
personnel during an emergency. A data informed modeling approach is used. Data 
collected using the VE has been used to define the memorized information in the HBM. 
An inductive reasoning approach - decision tree - is then used to model the evolution 
of general understanding of emergency situations through training and experience (Han 
et al., 2011). Decision tree offers a visual representation of the reasoning process and 
has valuable diagnostic capabilities. Compared to other methods, such as artificial 
neural networks, or support vector machines, decision trees can be constructed 
relatively quickly. Another benefit of decision tree that is particularly important for this 
research is that it does not require any prior assumptions about the data and can work 
with limited data compared to other techniques (Duffy, 2008). Given a collection of 
training examples (condition 𝑥, action 𝑓(𝑥)) the decision tree generates a hypothesis ℎ 
that approximates the action 𝑓(𝑥). The aim of the reasoning process is to find a 
hypothesis that fits well with the training examples (Shaw et al., 1990). In this research, 




examples. Use of experimental data, rather than SMEs’ opinions, allows capturing the 
actual observed variability in people’s learning and decision making process. 
• Special attention has been paid in this research to validate the developed HBM. All 
high-level tasks of HBM validation are performed. Special emphasis given on the 
acceptability criteria testing to make sure that the integrated HBM performs adequately 
under different operating conditions. Besides SMEs’ opinions, empirical evidence has 
been used during the validation process. The outcomes of HBM are tested against the 
acceptability criteria established from the observations of human behavior in an 
experimental setup. 
 
The expected contribution of the research includes: 
• Primary contribution of this research is to enable offshore emergency preparedness 
team training. The HBM developed in this research is integrated into AVERT to create 
intelligent software agents that can play the role of general personnel with different 
levels of skill. Three types of agents – naïve, ideal, and in-between – are created to 
facilitate the team training process. This will give the opportunity to train personnel in 
a team environment to understand team roles, communicate effectively, gain 
assertiveness and leadership qualities, manage stress, and make group decisions. 
Training such non-technical skills, which are critical for successful emergency 
handling, will increase competency and enhance safety of the personnel working in 




• The BN developed in this research can be used to assess people’s reliability during 
emergency situations. These results can be used to assess if someone is competent or 
reliable enough to handle emergency situations. 
• Though the primary purpose of BN models developed in this research is to assess 
people’s response during emergency situations, they can also be used as a diagnostic 
tool. The BN model can quantify people’s sensitivity to different PIFs and identify their 
strengths and weaknesses. For example, if a participant is found to be more sensitive to 
a PIF, then training scenarios with different variations of that PIF can be provided to 
the participant until an accepted level of competency is reached. This kind of adaptive 
training can help individuals to obtain competency faster. 
• Besides assessing the effect of external PIFs on human behavior, the research also looks 
into the effects of internal PIFs, such as bias, compliance, prioritization, and efficacy 
of information use. Conventionally, assessment of internal PIFs is done using a safety 
compliance questionnaire. Though questionnaires are sufficient to ensure that people 
have necessary knowledge about the safety procedures, they cannot ensure people will 
be able to apply that knowledge under the pressure of an emergency. In addition to 
questionnaires, this research uses virtual scenarios to assess internal PIFs. Assessment 
of internal PIFs using virtual scenarios can help to ensure that people not only know 





• Sensitivity analysis done for the internal PIFs can be useful in the personnel selection 
process. Knowing if someone is compliant or a risk taker can help identify into which 
role they would best fit. 
• The decision trees represent the behavioral pattern of individuals. Recognizing such 
patterns can be useful to predict what decision an individual might make for a given 
emergency situation. This can be extremely helpful in designing adaptive training so 
that individuals can reach competency faster.  
• The decision trees also reflect the learning and inference of individuals given the 
training. The problem-solving strategies identified using decision trees can be used to 
assess the efficacy of the training curriculum and/or pedagogical approach. It is 
expected that a sound training process would ensure convergence amongst trainees to 
strategies that lead to success. A systemic exception might be an indication of weakness 
of the training approach itself. Identification of such weakness can help design better 
training curricula or pedagogy. 
• The research demonstrates how use of empirical evidence along with SMEs’ opinion 
can facilitate the HBM validation process. 
1.6 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is written in manuscript format, including six journal papers as chapters. Table 
1.1 shows the papers written during the course of this research and establishes their 




Table 1.1: Papers and connection to the research objectives and associated tasks 
Papers as chapters Research objectives Associated tasks 
Chapter 2: Incorporating individual 
differences in human reliability 
analysis: an extension to the virtual 
experimental technique 
 
• To understand human behavior 
under influence of PIFs 
• To develop an integrated HBM to 
reproduce the behavior 
• Identify the cognitive tasks 
• Select appropriate external PIFs for offshore 
emergency situations 
• Create credible scenarios in VE by varying 
the level of PIFs 
• Observe people’s performance in the 
scenarios and collect data 
• Develop a BN to model the effect external 
PIFs on human performance 
• Incorporate individual differences while 
assessing the effect of external PIFs 
Chapter 3: Assessing offshore 
emergency evacuation behavior in a 
virtual environment using a 
Bayesian Network approach 
• To understand human behavior 
under influence of PIFs 
• To develop an integrated HBM to 
reproduce the behavior 
• Select appropriate internal PIFs 
• Develop a BN model to assess the effect of 
internal PIFs on human performance 
• Incorporate individual differences while 
assessing the effect of internal PIFs 
 
Chapter 4:  Identifying route 
selection strategies in offshore 
emergency situations using 
Decision Trees: A step towards 
adaptive training 
• To understand human behavior 
under influence of PIFs 
• To develop an integrated HBM to 
reproduce the behavior 
• Populate content of knowledge matrix 
• Identify people’s problem-solving strategies 
using a reasoning algorithm (i.e. decision 
tree algorithm) 
Chapter 5: Modeling and 
simulation of personnel response 
during offshore emergency 
situations 
• To develop an integrated HBM to 
reproduce the behavior 
• Integrate the BN model and reasoning 
structure to develop an HBM to reproduce 




Papers as chapters Research objectives Associated tasks 
Chapter 6: Validating human 
behavior representation model of 
general personnel during offshore 
emergency situations 
• To validate the HBM 
• Develop a set of requirements and 
acceptability criteria using SMEs opinion 
and empirical evidence 
• Validate the conceptual model  
• Validate the Knowledge base  
• Design test scenarios that examines both 
success and failure regions 
• Perform result validation 
Chapter 7: Human performance 
data collected in a virtual 
environment 
• To provide data availability and 
direction towards future work 
• Share the data collected during this research  
• Describe the data to facilitate reproduction 
if necessary 
• Discuss value of the data to help identify 






An outline of each chapter is presented below. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the experimental study done in this research to collect human 
performance data. The PIFs varied to create virtual emergency scenarios are described in 
detail. The chapter then discusses the integration of the collected data into a BN to assess 
reliability of individuals. The chapter also demonstrates how use of the virtual experimental 
technique allows one to account for individual differences during reliability assessment. 
 
Chapter 3 provides some more details on the experimental study. The focus of Chapter 3 is 
to investigate the effect of internal PIFs. The chapter shows how evidence collected from a 
virtual environment can be used to assess the internal PIFs. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the decision making process of the general personnel during offshore 
emergency evacuation. Data collected during the experimental study is used to populate the 
knowledge matrix of the participants. An inductive reasoning technique – decision tree – is 
then used to identify the problem-solving strategies of the participants. The paper shows 
that given the same training, people may learn and develop the general understanding of 
emergency situations differently. This results in different problem-solving strategies (i.e. 
route selection strategies) across participants. 
 
Chapter 5 describes how works done in Chapter 2 to 4 can be integrated to develop an HBM 




in this chapter consists of four component models - an environment model, an operator 
model, a performance shaping model, and a task network model. Understanding from 
Chapter 2 has been used to develop the environment model, understanding from Chapter 3 
is used in the development of the operator model. The performance model uses the 
understanding from Chapter 2 to 4. The task network model was primarily based on 
(DiMattia, Khan, & Amyotte, 2005) with additional modification done according to SMEs’ 
suggestions. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the validation of the developed HBM. The chapter discusses the high-
level tasks performed during the validation of an HBM. It starts by listing a set of 
requirements and acceptability criteria. It then discusses the conceptual model validation 
and knowledge base validation in detail. The complex behavior regions identified during 
conceptual model and knowledge base validation are used to design test scenarios for the 
result validation. Performance of the HBM is then tested in the designed scenarios and 
compared to the acceptability criteria established earlier using empirical evidence. 
 
The aim of Chapter 7 is to make the data collected during the research publicly available 
for potential reuse. The data are described in detail to facilitate reproduction if necessary. 






Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the thesis. It discusses the challenges faced during 
the research and provides recommendations to overcome them. The chapter also discusses 
potential future works. 
 
A co-authorship statement is provided at the beginning of each chapter. The statement 
describes the contribution of each author in different stages of the research. 
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Abstract 
Predicting human behavior and assessing human performance in offshore emergency 
conditions is a challenge. There are many human reliability analysis (HRA) methods 
available today, however none of these methods are applicable in the context of offshore 
emergencies. The data required to perform HRA for emergency conditions are not readily 
available and are difficult to retrieve from accident investigations. In the absence of 
emergency conditions data, the conventional approach of gathering data for HRA is using 
expert judgment. Expert judgment often suffers from uncertainty, subjectivity, and 
incompleteness which makes the reliability of this data collection technique questionable. 
Moreover, the technique has an underlying assumption that the influence of different 
factors on human performance is the same for all individuals. A more recent approach is to 
collect data by conducting experiment in virtual environments with human subjects. 
Though virtual experimental technique addresses the issues of uncertainty, subjectivity, and 
incompleteness, it still does not consider individual differences while assigning the 
influence of different factors on human performance. Unlike machines, each human is 
different and the influence of factors on performance may vary from individual to 
individual. This paper proposes to advance the virtual experimental technique by enabling 
the consideration of individual differences. An experiment using virtual environment was 
done to observe performances of 36 individuals during offshore emergency evacuation. By 




reliability of each individual was assessed. Sensitivity analysis was then performed to 
identify the most influential factors that contributed to failure in emergency conditions. 
This analysis can help identify specific weaknesses that a participant might have. For 
example, if a participant is found to be more sensitive to a particular factor, then training 
scenarios with different variations of the factor can be provided to the participant until an 
accepted level of competency is reached. Identification of a weakness can be combined 
with adaptive human factor training so that each individual can obtain competence more 
quickly. 
2.1 Introduction 
Human reliability is defined as the probability that a person correctly performs system-
required activities in a designated time period (Swain & Guttmann, 1983). There are many 
human reliability quantification techniques available today to assess how reliable humans 
are in different contexts.  Examples include: Success Likelihood Index Methodology 
(SLIM), Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), and A Technique for 
Human Error Analysis (ATHENA) (Kirwan, 1994; Cooper et al., 1996). The Bayesian 
network (BN) approach has also been applied to human reliability analysis (HRA) (Baraldi 
et al., 2009). Most of the human reliability quantification techniques involve the calculation 
of human error probability (HEP), which is the probability that a person will fail to carry 
out a task as required (Kirwan, 1994). Performance influencing factors (PIFs) are often 
used to calculate HEP (Blackman et al., 2008). Human performance, and hence error, is 
influenced by PIFs, and therefore the relationship between PIFs and human errors must be 




human error prediction techniques (i.e. SLIM, THERP, BN) often use expert judgment to 
define this relationship. Though expert judgement is a valuable technique, it can suffer from 
uncertainty, subjectivity, and incompleteness. Significant conflict among judgements may 
also arise when collected from multiple experts. Recent works (Musharraf et al., 2014) have 
proposed the use of virtual experimental technique as an alternative to expert judgement. 
This technique collects empirical evidences required to perform a human reliablity 
assessment by conducting experiments in virtual environments with human subjects. 
However, this work does not account for individual differences  when it comes to the 
influence or importance of PIFs on human errors. Humans are inherently different and 
therefore the role that different PIFs play on performance may vary from individual to 
individual. For example, consider a case where complexity and visibility are two different 
PIFs that can influence one's performance during an evacuation. While complexity can play 
a more important role than visibility for one individual, it can be the other way around for 
another individual. This paper proposes an expansion of the virtual experimental technique 
to account for individual differences during the HRA process. In this paper, the term 
individual difference refers to the difference between the sensitivity of two individuals to 
external PIFs. It does not cover the more general aspects that might differ between 
individuals such as gender, education, and physical characteristics. 
 
The HRA technique used in this paper is the BN approach. BNs have proven to be a 
powerful tool for HRA for the following reasons: 1) this approach can consider the 




and update the HEP, and 3) it can support the root-cause analysis of human error 
(Podofillini & Dang, 2013; Sundaramurthi & Smidts, 2013). BNs have been widely used 
to model the impact of different PIFs on human performance or human error (Baraldi, et 
al., 2009; Dang & Stempfel, 2012). Kim & Seong (2006), Cai et al. (2013) and Martins & 
Maturana (2013) show examples of using the evidential reasoning aspect of BN to find the 
underlying causes of human error. Also, the BN model allows the incorporation of multiple 
sources of data into a single predictive HRA model (Groth & Mosleh, 2012b). A more 
comprehensive list of the demonstrated benefits of BN for HRA in different domains can 
be found in Groth & Swiler (2013) and Mkrtchyan et al. (2015).  
 
In this paper, a BN model is developed to observe the impact of two PIFs (complexity and 
visibility) on human error during an offshore emergency evacuation. In this model, PIFs 
and errors are all random variables, and the probability of an error occurring is conditionally 
dependent on the PIFs. To define conditional dependencies in the BN, necessary data were 
collected from a study conducted in a virtual environment with 36 participants. At the 
beginning of the study each participant was assigned to one of two training groups: 1) G1: 
high level training and 2) G2: low level training. The training level assigned to each 
participant remained unchanged for the rest of the experiment. Virtual emergency scenarios 
were created with different levels of visibility (clearly visible versus blackout conditions) 
and complexity (low complexity, such as a muster drill vs. high complexity, such as a 
dynamic emergency situation).  Participants’ performance in the series of virtual 




reliability of each subject was assessed. Next, sensitivity analysis was performed to find 
the relative contribution of the PIFs to failure.  
 
Section 2.2 gives an overview of the BN approach to HRA and the virtual environment 
used in the experiment. Section 2.3 describes the methodology, data collection and 
integration using a case study of offshore emergency evacuation. Section 2.4 presents and 
explains the results. The limitation of the study and future works are discussed in Section 
2.5. Section 2.6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Bayesian network (BN) approach to HRA 
A BN approach was used to calculate the HEP. According to Pearl (1988), BNs are acyclic 
directed graphical models that represent conditional dependencies among a set of random 
variables. While performing a task or exercise, errors can occur at different steps of the 
process. Each error is regarded as the outcome of the joint influence of different PIFs (as 
depicted in Figure 2.1). In the BN approach to HRA, error is the critical node which 
depends on several PIFs that can influence the occurrence of the error. For example, in an 
offshore emergency evacuation situation, interacting with hazards (e.g. smoke or fire) is an 
error that may occur because the visibility is compromised (PIF1), or the operator is not 
familiar with the complexity of the situation (PIF2), or both. Figure 2.1 shows the 




PIFs (visibility and complexity) on human error. A comprehensive list of PIFs can be found 
in Groth & Mosleh (2012a) and Mearns et al. (2001). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between PIFs and human error. Error is the outcome of joint influence of 
PIF1 to PIFn. 
 
To define the relationship between a human error and PIFs, two parameters are needed: 1) 
the prior belief (in terms of probabilities) of the PIFs and 2) the conditional belief (in terms 
of probability distribution) of the human error. In this case, prior probabilities of all possible 
states of a PIF are assumed equal (50% if the PIF is binary). The difficult part is to define 
the conditional probabilities, which represent the conditional dependency of human error 
on PIFs. This paper uses data collected in a virtual environment to define these conditional 
dependencies. Conditional dependencies are defined separately for each individual to 
reflect the fact that influence of PIFs on error may vary from individual to individual. 




Once the probabilities of different errors during a task are calculated, they can be combined 
using the definitional/synthesis idiom, rather than a causal relationship, to achieve an 
overall failure probability for the task (Fenton & Neil, 2012). For example, in an offshore 
emergency evacuation situation, if an operator is interacting with a smoke hazard (Error1) 
while keeping all fire doors open throughout the evacuation process (Error2), then these 
errors can be combined to get an overall failure probability of the operator for the task 
evacuation. To reduce the computational complexity, errors (Error1-n) are first classified 
into categories (CT1-m) and then combined to get an overall failure (F) probability. The 
different categories of error considered in this paper are as follows: perception error, 
recognition error, procedural error, and lack of situational awareness. Each error can be 
classified into one or more categories. For example, interaction with a hazard can be 
categorized as a failure to perceive the severity of the hazard (perception error) and keeping 
fire doors open can be categorized as a procedural error. Figure 2.2 shows how error 
probabilities in different categories can be combined to quantify the overall failure 
probability. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.2, there are two relationships that need to be defined: 1) the 
relationship between the errors (Error1-n) and different categories (CT1-n) and 2) the 
relationship between different categories (CT1-n) and overall failure (F). Two parameters 
are needed to define these relationships: 1) the conditional belief (in terms of probability 
distribution) of the categories (CT), and 2) the conditional belief (in terms of probability 





Figure 2.2: Combining Error1 to Errorn to get an overall failure probability. Error1 to Errorn are 
first combined according to categories (CTs), the categories are then combined to get overall failure 
(F) probability. 
 
To demonstrate how conditional probability distribution of CTs can be defined, a simple 
case is considered where the category variable CT1 is binary and can have two possible 
states: acceptable and not acceptable. CT1 is assumed to be dependent on Error1 and 
Error2. Table 2.1 shows the conditional probability table for CT1. As shown in the table, 
P(CT1=Acceptable) becomes zero if either Error1 or Error2 occurs. The only case when 
P(CT1=Acceptable) becomes one is when none of the errors have occurred. 
 
The conditional probability table for the failure node F can be defined in the same way. A 











No. Table 2.2 shows the conditional probability table for F when it is dependent on CT1 
and CT2. As shown in Table 2.2, if either CT1 or CT2 is not acceptable, P(F=Yes) becomes 
one. P(F=Yes) becomes zero when both CT1 and CT2 are acceptable. 
 
Table 2.1: Conditional probability table for category (CT1) 
Error1 Error2 P(CT1=Acceptable|Error1,Error2) 
No No 1 
Yes No 0 
No Yes 0 
Yes Yes 0 
 
Table 2.2: Conditional probability table for failure (F) 
CT1 CT2 P(F=Yes|CT1, CT2) 
Acceptable Acceptable 0 
Not acceptable Acceptable 1 
Acceptable Not acceptable 1 
Not acceptable Not acceptable 1 
 
It has to be noted that, the relationships shown in Table 2.1 & 2.2 are defined by the analyst 
and are not dependent on the collected data. These relationships are context sensitive and 
may need to be redefined by the analyst for a given situation. Also, category variables are 
considered binary in this example only to simplify the illustration. In reality, the category 
variables can have two or more possible states depending on the context. 
 
Using the relationships shown in Figure 2.1 & 2.2, the final network can be developed (as 






Figure 2.3: BN to show causal dependency between PIFs, errors, and overall failure. 
 
2.2.2 Overview of virtual environment 
A virtual environment is a computer aided simulation environment that allows trainees to 
gain artificial experience including performing in dangerous scenarios. Virtual 
environment training can act as an enhancement to conventional training since training for 
emergency situations in the real world is ethically, logistically or financially unfeasible 
(Veitch et al., 2008). Besides facilitating emergency preparedness training, virtual 
environments can also be used as a tool to observe human performance in emergency 
conditions and collect data for HRA (Lois et al., 2009; Bye et al., 2011; Monferini et al., 
2013). The virtual environment used in the case study is called the all-hands virtual 
emergency response trainer (AVERT) and was developed at Memorial University. AVERT 




modeled after an offshore oil installation platform with high levels of detail. It is capable 
of creating credible emergency scenarios by introducing hazards such as blackouts, fires 
and explosions. For the case study, the offshore emergency scenarios covered a range of 
activities, from muster drills that required the participant to go to their primary muster 
station, to more complex emergency evacuation scenarios that required the participant to 
avoid hazards blocking their egress routes and muster at their lifeboat stations (House et 
al., 2014). The scenarios in the case study were designed using AVERT to observe the 
effect of the PIFs visibility and complexity on individuals’ performance during offshore 
emergency evacuation. Details of the case study are presented in the next section. 
2.3 Case study: Offshore emergency evacuation in a virtual environment 
2.3.1 Experimental setup 
The data used in this paper were originally collected during an experimental study 
presented in Smith (2015) and Musharraf et al. (2016). This paper uses the data collected 
during the study to demonstrate the incorporation of individual differences in HRA. 
 
A total of 36 participants took part in the study with a goal to learn how to perform a 
successful offshore emergency evacuation. The participants were naïve concerning any 
detail of the experimental design, they were not employed in the offshore oil and gas 
industry, and therefore they were not familiar with the offshore platform. Each participant 
was assigned to one of two groups for training: 1) G1: high level training and 2) G2: low 




was different between the two groups. In the first session, both groups received a basic 
offshore emergency preparedness tutorial. G1 then received 4 training scenarios, a multiple 
choice test and 4 testing scenarios. G2 only received the multiple choice test and 4 testing 
scenarios after the tutorial.  In both Session 2 and Session 3, G1 received an advanced 
training tutorial about alarms and hazards respectively, 4 additional training scenarios, a 
multiple choice test, and 4 testing scenarios. G2 received no advanced training tutorial and 
only received a multiple choice test and 4 testing scenarios in Sessions 2 and 3. Both groups 
were provided with feedback on their performance in the multiple choice test and virtual 
environment testing scenarios in each session.  
2.3.2 Design of the experiment 
Once a participant was assigned to a group, his/her training level remained static (either 
low or high) for the rest of the study. The other two PIFs: visibility and complexity, on the 
other hand, were set to different levels to investigate how these PIFs influence each 
participant.  
 
Visibility refers to the amount of ambient light available while performing a specific task. 
This PIFs was varied at two different levels: clearly visible and blackout. In clearly visible 
conditions, there was enough ambient light to perform the assigned task. In the blackout 
conditions, the visibility was reduced by reducing the available ambient light. However, 
the participants were allowed to use a virtual flashlight in the blackout conditions. The 





Complexity in this context refers to the difficulty of any given situation and the degree of 
responsibilities of an individual in that situation. The more difficult the situation is, the 
higher is the chances of human error. Similarly, higher responsibilities also imply higher 
chances of human error. Two levels of complexity were considered in this experiment: low 
and high. In low complexity conditions, there was no obstacle in the egress route, and the 
responsibility assigned to the participant was minimal. High complexity situations were 
created by blocking the escape routes with hazards (i.e. smoke, fire, and explosion), and 
assigning more responsibilities to the participants. 
 
Training and testing scenarios were designed with different levels of visibility and 
complexity. Several performance metrics of the participants were recorded during each 
scenario. The following are the performance metrics that are most relevant to this paper: 
time to muster, time spent running, interaction with fire doors and watertight doors, 
interaction with hazards, and reporting at muster stations. Replay videos of participants’ 
performance in the scenarios were also recorded for further analysis. For HRA purposes, 
only the performance metrics collected during the testing scenarios were used. Figure 2.4 
presents a schematic diagram of the experimental design. 
 
There were 4 testing scenarios in each session. For demonstration purposes, only the testing 
scenarios in Session 3 will be used in this paper. Table 2.3 gives an overview of the 4 testing 






Figure 2.4: Schematic diagram of the experimental design 








Scn1 Normal Low 
A fire and explosion on the helideck signal a GPA. High 
winds cause the smoke to engulf a portion of the platform 
exterior. The participant must go to muster station, but re-
route to lifeboat station due to the increase in emergency 
severity and the alarm change to PAPA. Complexity is 
low as the hazards do not block the primary route through 
the main stairwell. 
Scn2 Normal High 
Fire erupts in the galley signaling a GPA. The participant 
must go to the muster station but re-route to the lifeboat 
station due to the fire and smoke spreading to the adjacent 
muster station. Complexity is high as the primary egress 
route and the muster station are compromised by the 
hazards. 
Scn3 Blackout Low 
An electrical fire and dense smoke fill a portion of the 
engine room. The GPA sounds. The participant must go 
to muster station but re-route to lifeboat station due to the 
increase in situation severity and alarm change to PAPA. 
Complexity is low as the participant was assigned to only 











Scn4 Blackout High 
A fire and explosion occur in the main engine and result 
in a vessel-wide blackout. The alarm is not immediately 
triggered. The fire blocks access to the secondary egress 
routes. The participant must raise the alarm and go to the 
muster station but re-route to lifeboat station due to the 
increase in situation severity and alarm change to PAPA. 
Complexity is high as the participant had an additional 
responsibility of raising the alarm before evacuation. 
 
 
2.3.3 Bayesian Network (BN) for the case study: Data collection and integration 
The primary interest of the case study was to account for the difference between individuals 
while defining a relationship between the PIFs (visibility and complexity) and human error 
during offshore emergency evacuation. For this purpose, a set of possible errors during an 
offshore emergency evacuation was defined. Table 2.4 shows a list of possible errors and 
different error categories during an offshore emergency evacuation. For a BN approach to 
HRA, all listed errors are critical nodes and depend on the states of the PIFs. The prior 
probabilities of each state of the PIFs (visibility and complexity) are assumed 50%. The 
next step is to define the conditional probability distribution of each error. Table 2.5 shows 







Table 2.4: List of possible errors during offshore emergency evacuation and their corresponding 
category 
Error Category Possible errors 
Perception of hazard 
Interacting with fire 
Interacting with smoke 
Situational awareness 
Taking more time to muster than necessary 
Going to wrong muster location 
Recognition of alarm 
Failing to follow alarm and going to wrong muster 
location 
Compliance with basic safety 
procedures 
Running on the platform 
Leaving fire doors and/or watertight doors open 
 
Table 2.5: Conditional probability table for error “wrong muster station” 
Visibility Complexity P(Wrong muster station 
= Yes) 
P(Wrong muster 
station = No) 
Normal Low 
These conditional probabilities were defined using 
the data collected during the experiment. 
Normal High 
Blackout condition Low 
Blackout condition High 
 
 
As shown in Table 2.5, there are eight conditional probabilities that need to be defined. 
Data collected from virtual environment scenarios were used in this paper to obtain these 
probabilities. Each participant was tested in 4 testing scenarios during each session: Scn1 
(visibility=normal, complexity=low), Scn2 (visibility=normal, complexity=high), Scn3 
(visibility=blackout condition, complexity=low) and Scn4 (visibility=blackout condition, 
complexity= high). For instance, in Scn1, if the participant went to the wrong muster 
station, P(wrong muster station=Yes| visibility=normal, complexity=low) = 1 and hence 




probabilities were defined the same way. Table 2.6 shows the conditional probability table 
for the error “wrong muster station” after the data were collected for one participant. It 
should to be noted that, unlike the conventional approaches, these conditional probabilities 
are defined for each individual and may vary from participant to participant. Figure 2.5 
shows the total probability of “wrong muster station” after the collected data were 
integrated. 
 
Table 2.6: Conditional probability table for the error “wrong muster station” after collecting data for 
one participant 
Visibility Complexity P(Wrong muster station 
= Yes) 
P(Wrong muster station 
= No) 
Normal Low 0 1 
Normal High 0 1 
Blackout condition Low 0 1 
Blackout condition High 0 1 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Total probability of “wrong muster location” after integrating the data collected for the 




The data were collected and integrated similarly for all the errors listed in Table 2.4. The 
errors were combined as presented in Figure 2.3, to get probabilities for the different error 
categories. Finally, the different categories of error were combined to get the overall failure 
probability for one participant. The conditional probabilities of the error categories and 
failure were defined using the same approach shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Figure 2.6 















2.4 Results and discussion 
2.4.1 Results of complete study 
Section 2.3.3 explained the failure probability calculation for one sample participant in 
detail. The failure probability was calculated for all 36 participants in the same way. Figure 
2.7 shows the histogram of failure probability for all participants. As shown in the figure, 
almost 83% of the participants had a failure probability of 50% or higher.  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Histogram of percent failure probability for 36 participants in Session 3 
 
As stated in Section 2.3.1, the participants were divided into two groups and G1 had a more 




and G2 shows that the average failure probability of G2 was much higher (63.5%) 
compared to G1 (43.2%). This is consistent with the expectation that advanced training can 
reduce the likelihood of failure in emergency conditions.  
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis: which PIF contributes most to failure? 
Once the failure probability of a participant was calculated, sensitivity analysis was 
performed to determine which PIF (visibility or complexity) contributed most to failure for 
the given participant. Figure 2.8 shows the tornado graph (Fenton & Neil, 2012) of 
sensitivity analysis for the same participant as in section 2.3.2. As shown in Figure 2.8, the 
probability of failure given complexity went from 0.375 to 0.75 (when changing 
complexity from low to high). Similarly, probability of failure given visibility went from 
0.5 to 0.625 (when changing visibility from a blackout to normal conditions). For the 








Sensitivity analysis was done similarly for all participants, and Figure 2.9 summarizes the 
results of this analysis. 19% of the participants were found to be more sensitive to 
complexity and 11% were found to be more sensitive to visibility. The rest of the 
participants were equally sensitive to both complexity and visibility. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Sensitivity of 36 participants 
 
In a comparison between G1 and G2, both of the PIFs were equally important for 70% of 
the participants in G1 and 68% of the participants in G2. Among the remaining participants 
in G1, 25% were more sensitive to complexity, and only 5% were more sensitive to 
visibility. In G2 16% of the remaining participants were found to be more sensitive to 





























The results support the fact that sensitivity to PIFs may vary from participant to participant. 
Sensitivity analysis can be extremely helpful in personalizing training. For example, if a 
participant is found to be more sensitive to high complexity, training exercises with high 
complexity situations can be provided to better prepare for those situations and reduce the 
probability of failure. Such adaptive training will help to reach competency faster than with 
conventional training.  
2.5 Limitations of the study 
There are a few limitations with the current study that need to be considered. First of all, it 
has to be considered that virtual environments can provide a certain degree of realism and 
should not be expected to be an exact counterpart to real life emergency situations. Testing 
the validity of the achieved outcomes in a real world operational environment is out of the 
scope of this paper and is considered as a future research study. Secondly, since the work 
presented in this paper was done retrospectively, the experimental settings were not ideal 
for this particular work. For example, testing scenarios in each session were not randomized 
as they should have been for the purpose of this paper. Finally, to keep the experiment 
feasible in a laboratory setting, the effect of only two PIFs (complexity and visibility) were 
examined in the presented work. A more comprehensive set of PIFs will be used in future 
studies based on the context and associated priorities. 
 
It must be noted that incorporation of individual differences presents new challenges in the 
conventional verification and validation paradigm. Since conditional probabilities in the 




suggested in a conventional validity framework is nearly impossible (Pitchforth & 
Mengersen, 2013). However, BNs developed in this paper are integrated into human 
behavior models (HBMs) in later work (Musharraf et al., 2017). The authors are currently 
working on the validation of the HBM with the underlying belief that the uncertainty 
involved in the BN structure is negligible. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Reliability analysis of operators during offshore emergency conditions has always been a 
challenge due to the lack of data. The virtual experimental technique proposes to use virtual 
environments as a data source for the reliability analysis. This paper proposes an extension 
of the virtual experimental technique by incorporating individual differences. Performance 
data for each individual is first collected by conducting an experiment in a virtual 
environment. By integrating the collected data into a BN model, the reliability of any 
individual during an offshore emergency evacuation can be assessed. The model can also 
be used to perform a sensitivity analysis to determine if the individual is sensitive to any 
specific PIF. Though the case study presented in this paper suffers from a few limitations, 
it successfully demonstrates how individual differences can be taken into account while 
calculating human reliability. It also presents the way of identifying individuals’ sensitivity 
to any external PIF. Future work involves using the results of the sensitivity analysis to 
help designing adaptive training for individuals. Adaptive training applied to virtual 
environments can help overcome any weakness an individual might have and assist them 
in achieving competence more quickly. Authors also plan to use a more comprehensive and 




this paper will not be done separately, validation of the integrated HBM model is 
considered as a future work. 
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In the performance influencing factor (PIF) hierarchy, person-based influencing factors 
reside in the top level along with machine-based, team-based, organization-based and 
situation/stressor-based factors. Though person-based PIFs like morale, motivation, and 
attitude (MMA) play an important role in shaping performance, it is nearly impossible to 
assess such PIFs directly. However, it is possible to measure behavioral indicators (e.g. 
compliance, use of information) that can provide insight regarding the state of the 
unobservable person-based PIFs. One common approach to measuring these indicators is 
to carry out a self-reported questionnaire survey. Significant work has been done to make 
such questionnaires reliable, but the potential validity problem associated with any 
questionnaire is that the data are subjective and thus may bear a limited relationship to 
reality. This paper describes the use of a virtual environment to measure behavioral 
indicators, which in turn can be used as proxies to assess otherwise unobservable PIFs like 
MMA. A Bayesian Network (BN) model is first developed to define the relationship 
between person-based PIFs and measurable behavioral indicators. The paper then shows 
how these indicators can be measured using evidence collected from a virtual environment 
of an offshore petroleum installation. A study that focused on emergency evacuation 
scenarios was done with 36 participants. The participants were first assessed using a 
multiple choice test. They were then assessed based on their observed performance during 
simulated offshore emergency evacuation conditions. A comparison of the two assessments 
demonstrates the potential benefits and challenges of using virtual environments to assess 





Since its introduction in 1960, more than a dozen Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
methods have been proposed to identify, model and quantify the probability of human 
errors. Most HRA methods involve the use of performance influencing factors (PIFs) to 
qualify and quantify human error probability (HEP). To ensure consistency across different 
HRA methods, Groth & Mosleh (2012) presented a standard set of PIFs and a PIF 
hierarchy. According to this hierarchy, all PIFs can be categorized in five categories: 
organization-based, team-based, person-based, situation/stressor-based, and machine-
based. PIFs in these five categories can be observable, partially observable, or unobservable 
depending on how the states of the PIFs are assessed. If the state of a PIF can be assessed 
through direct measurement, then it is considered observable. Tool availability is an 
organization-based PIF that is directly observable: either the tool is available or it is not. 
An example of a partially observable PIF is the situation/stressor-based PIF complexity. 
The level of complexity depends on the perception of the individual and it cannot be 
directly measured. Complexity can be partially observed in terms of the number of assigned 
tasks at a given time: more tasks indicate at least nominally higher complexity. Finally, 
there are PIFs that are nearly impossible to measure and hence are called unobservable 
PIFs. Examples include person-based PIFs like moral, motivation, and attitude (MMA). 
Though most of the HRA methods provide guidelines about how to assess the state of 
observable and partially observable PIFs, there is a lack of specific guidelines regarding 
assessing the state of unobservable PIFs. One possible solution is to associate the 




state of the unobservable PIFs. For example, a person’s attitude towards safety is 
unobservable, but it is possible to measure if the person complies with safety rules, so 
compliance is an indicator that can be used to assess safety attitude. 
 
Studies have been done to measure these indicators by a subjective analysis (Rundmo et 
al., 1998; Rundmo, 2000; Adie et al., 2005). In these studies, a self-assessment 
questionnaire survey is conducted among personnel on offshore installations to gain insight 
into unobservable PIFs like safety attitude.  Though significant work has been done to make 
self-assessment questionnaires reliable (Mearns & Flin, 1995; Flin et al., 2000), it is still 
questionable if self-assessment is a true reflection of the way an operator will behave in 
real emergencies. Questionnaires have the inherent risk of representing one’s knowledge 
about safety and/or one’s willingness to behave safely, rather than representing one’s actual 
behavior in emergency situations (Breitsprecher et al., 2007). This paper describes the use 
of a virtual environment to measure indicators that can provide insight into unobservable 
PIFs like MMA. A Bayesian network (BN) was developed to define relationships among 
unobservable PIFs and associated indicators. The network was then extended by 
associating the measurable indicators with evidence that can be collected using a virtual 
environment. An experimental study of offshore emergency evacuation in a virtual 
environment was done with 36 human subjects. Behavioral indicators of the participants 
were assessed using both a multiple choice test and the performance evidence collected 




potential benefits and challenges of using virtual environments to assess behavioral 
indicators. 
 
Section 3.2 gives an overview of the virtual environment used in the paper and explains the 
fundamentals of BN. Section 3.3 describes a BN approach to quantify unobservable PIFs. 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the application of the proposed approach to a case study 
of offshore emergency evacuation. Results are presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 lists 
the limitations of the study. Section 3.8 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Overview of virtual environment 
A virtual environment is a computer aided simulation environment that allows trainees to 
gain artificial experience, including performing in dangerous scenarios. Virtual 
environment training can act as an enhancement to conventional training since training for 
emergency situations in the real world is ethically, logistically or financially unfeasible 
(Veitch et al., 2008). Besides facilitating emergency preparedness training, virtual 
environments can also be used as a tool to observe human performance in emergency 
conditions (Lois et al., 2009; Bye et al., 2011; Monferini et al., 2013). The virtual 
environment used in the case study is called the all-hands virtual emergency response 
trainer (AVERT) and was developed at Memorial University. AVERT was designed to 
enhance offshore emergency response training. The virtual environment is modeled after 




credible emergency scenarios by introducing hazards such as blackouts, fires and 
explosions. For the case study, the offshore emergency scenarios covered a range of 
activities, from muster drills that required the participant to go to their primary muster 
station, to more complex emergency evacuation scenarios that required the participant to 
avoid hazards blocking their egress routes and muster at their lifeboat stations (House et 
al., 2014). 
3.2.2 Bayesian network fundamentals 
BNs are probabilistic models representing interaction of parameters through directed 
acyclic graph and Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) (Pearl, 1988). The networks are 
composed of nodes and links. Nodes represent the variables of interest whereas links 
joining the nodes represent causal relations among the variables. Nodes and links together 
define the qualitative part of the network. The quantitative part is constituted by the 
conditional probabilities associated with the variables. Conditional probabilities specify the 
probability of each dependent variable (also called child node) for every possible 
combination of the states of the variables it is directly dependent on (also called parent 
node).  The probabilities of the independent variables, i.e., nodes with no predecessor (also 
called root nodes) are also given. Given the probabilities associated with each root node 
and the conditional probability table associated with each child node, the probabilities of 
child node can be calculated (Fenton & Neil, 2012). If there are 𝑛 variables 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛 
in the network and 𝑃𝑎(𝑋𝑖) represents the set of parents of each 𝑋𝑖, then the joint probability 








where 𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝑎(𝑋𝑖)) is the discrete conditional probability distributions of  𝑋𝑖  given its 
parents. 
Therefore, the following need to be specified to define a BN:  
1) the set of variables (nodes): 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛, 
2) the interaction (links) between variables, and 
3) the conditional probability distribution 𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝑎(𝑋𝑖)) for each variable  𝑋𝑖. 
This paper presents a BN model to quantify unobservable PIFs. Section 3.3 illustrates how 
the BN model is defined. 
3.3 Quantifying unobservable PIFs: A Bayesian network (BN) approach 
This section presents the BN model to quantify unobservable PIFs. First, a set of necessary 
variables is defined. Having defined the variables, the relationship between variables (both 
links and conditional dependency) are specified. 
3.3.1 Variables 
Two types of variables compose the proposed BN model: variables to measure the 
unobservable PIFs, and variables to collect evidence. 
3.3.1.1 Variables to measure unobservable PIFs 
Unobservable PIFs are impossible to measure directly. There are several PIFs in the 
standard set that are unobservable, but the focus of this paper is on the person-based PIFs 




directly observable, but internal characteristics of individuals manifest themselves in the 
way they behave, and behaviors are observable (Groth & Mosleh, 2012). Hence the 
unobservable PIFs have been associated with measurable behavioral indicators in this 
paper. 
 
Groth et al. (2012) define bias as "the tendency of a human to make conclusions based on 
selected pieces of information while excluding information that does not agree with the 
conclusion." It is impossible to directly measure if an individual has a bias and the degree 
to which the bias is present. In this paper, bias is associated with behavioral indicators 
inclination to previous experience and information use, which are measurable and can help 
to define the state of bias at a given time. It can be tested if in any given situation an 
individual disregards valuable information in order to come to a conclusion that has worked 
well for him/her on previous occasions. Thus, inclination to previous experience and 
information use are indicators of bias. An expanded list of biases and mechanisms can be 
found in (Brewer, 2005). 
 
Morale, motivation, and attitude together refer to the "willingness to complete tasks, the 
amount of effort a person devotes to tasks, and the state of mind of the worker" (Steers & 
Porter, 1979; Triandis, 1971). MMA plays a significant role in shaping the performance of 
an individual, but it is extremely difficult to measure. There are measurable behavioral 
indicators that are associated with MMA: information use, prioritization, and compliance. 




presented to him/her. Individuals may favor some information over others due to bias. 
Prioritization is how an individual orders the tasks assigned to them, or the goals that are 
to be achieved. Compliance refers to an individual’s commitment to follow directions and 
policies established by the organization or the industry.  Information use, prioritization, 
and compliance are behaviors shaped by the MMA of an individual. Additional behaviors 
can be included depending on the context.  
 
Table 3.1 lists the unobservable PIF variables and associated behavior indicator variables 
used in this paper. 
 
Table 3.1: List of unobserved PIF variables and associated behavior indicator variables 
Unobservable PIF variables  Associated behavior indicator variables  
Bias Inclination to previous experience 
Information use 




All unobservable PIF variables and associated behavior indicator variables are considered 
to be binary in this paper (i.e. the participant is either compliant or not). 
3.3.1.2 Variables to collect evidence 
Once behavioral indicators associated with each unobservable PIF are identified, the next 
step is to measure these indicators. For this purpose, each behavioral indicator variable is 




behavioral indicators. One possible source of evidence is multiple choice test items in a 
self-assessment questionnaire (Rundmo, 2000). Using this source, behavioral indicators are 
associated with multiple choice test items and are assessed based on the answers given by 
the participant. The fundamental problem of using multiple choice test items as evidence is 
that the answers individuals choose in the questionnaire often represent their knowledge 
about the safety regulations and/or their desire to act safely, rather than how they will 
actually behave under high risk, time pressure, and complexity of emergency conditions. 
Another problem with multiple choice questionnaires is the high guessing factor, which 
represents the possibility that an individual will guess the right answer to a question by 
chance even when he/she does not know the answer. 
 
In addition to multiple choice questionnaires, this paper uses the performance of 
participants in a virtual environment to collect evidence regarding behavioral indicators. 
The behavioral indicators to be assessed are associated with different tasks and exercises 
that an individual will perform in the virtual emergency scenarios. The indicators can then 
be measured based on how the individual performs the assigned tasks. Unlike 
questionnaires, a virtual environment is capable of simulating the dynamism and urgency 
of emergency scenarios and is expected to be a closer representation of an individual's 
performance in real life emergency. As performing in a virtual environment scenario is an 






Thus, evidence variables of the proposed BN model are either multiple choice items (in 
case of self-assessment multiple choice questionnaire), or tasks/exercises (in case of virtual 
environment scenarios). They are considered to be binary in both cases (i.e. the participant 
either answers a question correctly or not). 
3.3.2 Relationships between variables 
Once variables are defined, the next step is to define the relationship between variables. 
This requires that both the links and parameters be specified for each relationship. 
3.3.2.1 Relationships between unobservable PIFs and behavioral indicators 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1.1, unobservable internal characteristics like bias and MMA 
have a causal influence on the way an individual behaves. Adding these dependencies 
between unobservable PIFs and behavioral indicators gives a BN shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
The parameters of the network shown in Figure 3.1 are: 1) the prior belief (in terms of 
probabilities) of the unobservable PIF variables 𝑃(𝑈𝑉), and 2) conditional belief (in terms 
of probability distribution) of indicator variables 𝑃(𝐼𝑉|𝑈𝑉𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛). The prior 
probabilities of the possible states of each unobservable PIF are assumed to be equal (50%). 
The conditional probabilities are approximated by a canonical interaction model: the binary 
Noisy-OR gate (Pearl, 1988). Two assumptions of the Noisy-OR model are: 1) each of the 
unobservable PIFs is sufficient to shape a behavior with a probability of 𝑝𝑖 in the absence 
of all other causes, and 2) the ability of each unobservable PIF being sufficient is 




is formed by the unobservable PIF 𝑈𝑉𝑖 when all other causes 𝑈𝑉𝑗, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖,  are absent, then 
the conditional probability distribution of the behavioral indicator variables can be defined 
as: 
 
𝑃(𝐼𝑉 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|{𝑈𝑉1, 𝑈𝑉2, … , 𝑈𝑉𝑛}) = 1 −  ∏(1 − 𝑝𝑖)
𝑖∈𝑆
                                   (3.2) 
 
where 𝑆 is a subset of the 𝑈𝑉𝑖𝑠 that are present. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Causal dependency between the unobservable PIFs and the associated behavioral 
indicators 
 
3.3.2.2 Relationships between behavioral indicators and evidential variables 
Relationships between behavioral indicators and evidential variables are based on the 
causality that behaviors have an influence on how a question will be answered or a situation 




the causal dependency between the behavioral indicators and collected evidence (EV1 to 
EVn). The probability assignment of the behavioral indicator variables 𝑃(𝐼𝑉) is already 
described in Section 3.3.2.1. The additional parameter for the network shown in Figure 3.2 
is the conditional belief (in terms of probability distribution) of the evidential 
nodes 𝑃(𝐸𝑉|𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛). To approximate the conditional probability, again the 
binary Noisy-OR gate is used. If 𝑝𝑖 represents the probability that a behavior 𝐼𝑉𝑖 will 
influence an individual to choose a correct answer to a question, or take a correct action in 
the virtual scenarios when all other causes 𝐼𝑉𝑗 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, are absent, then the conditional 
probability distribution of the evidential variables can be defined as: 
 
𝑃(𝐸𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡|{𝐼𝑉1, 𝐼𝑉2, … , 𝐼𝑉𝑛}) =  1 −  ∏(1 − 𝑝𝑖)
𝑖∈𝑆
                                        (3.3) 
 
where 𝑆 is a subset of the 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑠 that are present. 
 
Combining the causal dependencies shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, a complete causal model 
can be developed as shown in Figure 3.3. Using this model, we can infer what we cannot 






Figure 3.2: Causal dependency model of the behavioral indicators and collected evidence. EV1 to EVn 
represent collected evidence: either a multiple choice test item or a task in a virtual environment 









3.4 Case study: Offshore emergency evacuation 
This paper assesses the behavioral indicators of individuals by using both a multiple choice 
test and virtual environment scenarios. As stated in Section 3.2.1, a virtual environment 
called AVERT was used in this study. An experimental study was designed using AVERT 
with multiple research objectives: 1) assess competency in offshore emergency evacuation 
using virtual environments (Smith et al., 2015), 2) collect data for human reliability 
assessment using virtual environments, and 3) assess behavioral indicators of individuals' 
during offshore emergency evacuation using virtual environments. The focus of this paper 
is to demonstrate the use of virtual environments to assess behavioral indicators and in turn 
assess unobservable PIFs. 
 
A total of 36 participants took part in the study with a goal to learn how to perform a 
successful offshore emergency evacuation. The participants were naïve concerning any 
detail of the experimental design, they were not employed in the offshore oil and gas 
industry, and therefore they were not familiar with the offshore platform. Each participant 
was assigned to one of two groups: 1) G1: high level training and 2) G2: low level training.  
Participants in both groups attended 3 sessions. The content of each session was different 
between the two groups. In the first session, both groups received a basic offshore 
emergency preparedness tutorial. G1 then received 4 training scenarios, a multiple choice 
test and 4 testing scenarios. G2 only received the multiple choice test and 4 testing scenarios 
after the tutorial.  In both Session 2 and Session 3, G1 received an advanced training tutorial 




test, and 4 testing scenarios. G2 received no advanced training tutorial and only received a 
multiple choice test and 4 testing scenarios in Sessions 2 and 3. Both groups were provided 
with feedback on their performance in the multiple choice test and virtual environment 
testing scenarios in each session. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 summarize the design of the 
experiment. 
 
Figure 3.4: Experimental design of Session 1 
 




The training and testing scenarios were designed with varying levels of visibility (clearly 
visible or blackout conditions) and complexity (low complexity with no obstacles on the 
primary evacuation route, high complexity with obstacles on the escape route and increased 
responsibility).  Several performance metrics of the participants were recorded during each 
scenario. The following are the performance metrics that are most relevant to this case 
study: route selected for evacuation, time spent running, interaction with fire doors and 
watertight doors, interaction with hazards, reporting at muster stations, and interaction with 
manual alarm. Replay videos of participants’ performance in scenarios were also recorded 
for further analysis. Performance and behavior of the participants were assessed in the 
multiple choice test and virtual environment testing scenarios. As stated above, there was 
only 1 multiple choice test and 4 virtual environment testing scenarios in each of the 
sessions. For demonstration purposes, only the multiple choice test and virtual environment 
testing scenarios of the last session (Session 3) have been included in this paper. Table 3.2 
shows how the different questions (EV) in the multiple choice test for Session 3 were used 
to assess behavioral indicators (IV). Each question listed in Table 3.2 had multiple options 
to choose from. Table 3.3 gives an overview of the 4 testing scenarios and shows how 









Table 3.2: Multiple choice questions in Session 3 used to assess the behavioral indicators 
Question 
number 
Question to collect evidence (EV) Behavioral 
indicators 
assessed (IV) 
S3_Q2 The Station Bill provides what information? Information Use 
S3_Q3 What do you do in the event that your primary muster 
station is compromised? 
Compliance 
S3_Q4 If you can't remember how to get to your muster station 
what should you do? 
Information Use 
S3_Q6 What do you do in the event of a minor incident?  Prioritization 
S3_Q7 What would you do in the event of an alarm that wasn't 
followed by a PA announcement? 
Compliance 
S3_Q8 What is the safest exit to take given where the hazard 
is located? [A diagram of the situation was given that 
depicted an explosion and fire in the engine room, 
blocking access to the secondary and tertiary egress 
routes.] 
Compliance 
S3_Q14 What do you do when your primary muster route has 
been blocked? 
Compliance 
S3_Q17 What is the safest exit to take given where the hazard 
is located? 
[A diagram of the situation was given that depicted a 
hallway filling with smoke outside the cabin, blocking 
access to the primary egress route.] 
Compliance 
S3_Q18 What is the safest exit to take given where the hazard 
is located? 
[A diagram of the situation was given that depicted fire 
and smoke in the engine room, blocking access to the 




















Fire erupts in the gally signaling 
a General Platform Alarm 
(GPA). The participant must go 
to the muster station but re-route 
to the lifeboat station due to the 
fire and smoke spreading to the 





Follow alarm Compliance, 
Information use 
Avoid running in the 
platform 
Compliance 
Keep fire doors and 
watertight doors closed 
Compliance, 
Information use 




carefully and learn 
about correct muster 
station so that mistake 
is not repeated 
Information use 
Avoid previously 






A fire and explosion on the 
helideck signal a GPA. High 
winds cause the smoke to engulf 
a portion of the platform 
exterior. The participant must 
go to muster station but re-route 
to lifeboat station due to the 
increase in emergency severity 
and the alarm change to Prepare 
to Abandon Platform (PAPA). 




An electrical fire and dense 
smoke fill a portion of the 
engine room, blocking access to 
the primary egress route. The 
GPA sounds. The participant 
must go to muster station but re-
route to lifeboat station due to 
the increase in situation severity 
and alarm change to PAPA. 















A fire and explosion in the main 
engine result in a vessel-wide 
blackout. The alarm is not 
immediately triggered. The fire 
blocks access to the secondary 
egress routes. The participant 
must raise the alarm and go to 
the muster station but re-route to 
lifeboat station due to the 
increase in situation severity and 
alarm change to PAPA. 
Same as S3_Scn1 with 
the added following 
task: Raise the alarm 
before evacuating if 










Association of evidence variables (EV) with behavioral indicators (IV) shown in Tables 
3.2 & 3.3 are defined by the analyst based on the understanding of the context. The next 
section shows how evidence collected from the multiple choice tests and the virtual 
environment scenarios were integrated in the BN developed in Section 3.3 to assess 
behavioral indicators and unobservable PIFs. 
3.5 Integrating evidence in Bayesian network (BN) 
3.5.1 Integrating evidence collected using multiple choice test 
Test questions were the evidence variables in the case of the multiple choice test. 
Integration of the evidence variables (as shown in Table 3.2) in the BN proposed in Section 
3.3 provided the final network shown in Figure 3.6. As stated in Section 3.3, the prior 
probabilities of each possible state of the unobservable PIF variables were assumed to be 
equal (50%). The conditional probability distributions of indicator variables and evidence 




𝑝𝑖s used in equations 3.1 and 3.2 are defined by the analyst and are not dependent on the 
collected data. Values of 𝑝𝑖s are context sensitive and may need to be redefined for a given 
situation. As discussed in Section 3.3, an individual can guess the right answer to a question 
by chance even when he/she does not know the answer. To address this issue, the 
conditional probability 𝑃(𝐸𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡|{𝐼𝑉1, 𝐼𝑉2, … , 𝐼𝑉𝑛}) is considered to be equal to a 
guess factor when all the 𝐼𝑉𝑖s are absent. If a multiple choice question had 𝑛 possible 
options to choose from, the guess factor would be considered to be 1/𝑛 (Millán et al., 
2013). 
 
The state of the evidence variables was defined based on the answers the participants chose 
in the multiple choice test. Figure 3.7 presents the state of the network after all the questions 
in the multiple choice test were answered (using one participant’s results as an example). 
3.5.2 Integrating evidence collected using virtual environment testing scenarios 
The tasks performed in the virtual environment were the evidence variables in the virtual 
testing scenarios. Integration of the evidence variables in the testing scenarios (as shown in 
Table 3.3) in the BN proposed in Section 3.3 yielded the network shown in Figure 3.8. 
Similar to the multiple choice test, the prior probabilities of each possible state of the 
unobservable PIF variables were assumed to be equal (50%) and the conditional probability 
distributions of indicator variables and evidence variables were calculated using equations 
3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Again the 𝑝𝑖s are defined by the analyst and may need to be 
redefined for a different context. However, unlike the multiple choice test, the guess factor 




problems and the chances that an individual will make a correct decision or take a correct 
action by chance, without knowing, was considered to be low. 
 
The state of the evidence variables was defined based on the decisions and actions of the 
participants in the virtual environment testing scenario. Figure 3.9 shows the state of the 









Figure 3.6: BN model to assess behavioral indicators and unobservable PIFs using multiple choice test. From bottom to top, the first level 




















Figure 3.8: BN model to assess behavioral indicators and unobservable PIFs using virtual environment test scenario. From bottom to top, the first 














3.6 Result and discussion 
Figures 3.7 and 3.9 show the scores of the same sample participant for the multiple choice 
test and in a virtual environment testing scenario, respectively. The performance of all 36 
participants was assessed using multiple choice tests and virtual environment testing 
scenarios for all 3 sessions, and scores were calculated similarly. Table 3.4 shows a 
comparison between average scores of all participants for the multiple choice test in Session 
3, and in the most complex testing scenario in Session 3 (denoted as S3_Scn4). For both 
compliance and prioritization, the average score for the testing scenario S3_Scn4 was 
below the multiple choice test (57% vs. 97% for compliance, and 57% vs. 94% for 
prioritization). However, participants were able to use information more effectively in the 
virtual environment scenario than the multiple choice test (average score 90% vs. 80% for 
information use). The differences in the scores shows that the participants behaved 
differently than anticipated based on the multiple choice test when put in a highly complex 
virtual emergency situation. Many of the participants who were able to successfully answer 
multiple choice questions related to prioritization and compliance were unable to 
demonstrate these in the virtual environment testing scenario. This is an indication that the 
multiple choice test can be used to diagnose an individual’s knowledge about safety 
regulations and/or their willingness to behave safely. However, the sole use of a multiple 
choice test cannot predict if the individuals will be able to put their knowledge and 





Table 3.4: Comparison between average scores in the multiple choice test and virtual environment 
testing scenario S3_Scn4 in Session 3 
Behavioral indicators Multiple choice test 
(%) 
Testing scenario (%) 
Information Use (Effective) 80 90 
Compliance (Yes) 97 57 
Prioritization (Right) 94 57 
   
MMA (Good) 96 61 
 
As stated in Section 3.4, participants were divided into two groups: 1) G1: high level 
training or 2) G2: low level training. Table 3.5 shows a comparison between the average 
scores of the two groups. For compliance and prioritization, both of the groups performed 
better in the multiple choice test than in the virtual environment testing scenario. Both 
groups demonstrated better use of information in the testing scenario compared to the 
multiple choice test. In the multiple choice test, G1 demonstrated superior performance in 
terms of information use and compliance (86% vs. 75% for information use, and 99% vs. 
95% for compliance). G1 & G2 showed similar performance in prioritizing tasks (94% vs. 
95% for task prioritization), in the multiple choice test. Similar results were found for the 
virtual environment testing scenario. G1 demonstrated better information using capabilities 
and compliance compared to G2 (93% vs 87% for information use, and 62% vs. 53% for 
compliance) in the virtual environment testing scenario. G1 showed slightly better 






Table 3.5: Comparison between average scores of G1 and G2 in multiple choice test and virtual 

















86 75 93 87 
Compliance 
(Yes) 
99 95 62 53 
Prioritization 
(Right) 
94 95 58 56 
     
MMA (Good) 97 95 64 58 
 
Figures 3.10 to 3.12 show a one to one comparison of the multiple choice test scores and 
the virtual environment testing scenario scores for all participants for information use, 
compliance, and prioritization, respectively. The percentages of participants (in the total 
sample size) who achieved good scores in both the multiple choice test and the virtual 
environment testing scenario are 69%, 28% and 14% for information use, compliance and 
prioritization, respectively. There was a significant difference between the scores of the 
multiple choice test and the virtual environment testing scenario for the remaining 
participants. For compliance, 69% of the participants achieved a good score in the multiple 
choice test but failed to demonstrate so in the virtual environment testing scenario. For 
prioritization, this percentage was 78%. For information use, the result was quite the 
contrary. Only 6% of participants achieved a better score in the multiple choice test than in 
the virtual environment testing scenario. However, 22% of the participants achieved a 
better score for information use in the virtual environment testing scenario than in the 





Figure 3.10: One to one comparison of each participant’s virtual environment testing scenario score 
and their multiple choice test score for the behavioral indicator information use 
 
Figure 3.11: One to one comparison of each participant’s virtual environment testing scenario score 





Figure 3.12: One to one comparison of each participant’s virtual environment testing scenario score 
and their multiple choice test score for the behavioral indicator prioritization 
 
The fact that a substantial number of participants who achieved a high score in the multiple 
choice test failed to demonstrate so in the virtual environment testing scenario indicates 
that a multiple choice test can be used to assess participants’ knowledge and/or their 
willingness to follow instructions, but that it cannot assess whether the participants will be 
able to apply the knowledge and willingness in emergency conditions. Similarly, a 
participant who received a good score in the virtual environment testing scenario and a poor 
score in the multiple choice test may have a sound judgement in a particular situation but 
may lack the knowledge and/or willingness. Rather than using a multiple choice test or a 































a better understanding of individuals’ behavior in emergency conditions and help ensure 
they are better prepared for emergency situations. The multiple choice test can be used 
initially to provide an assessment of individuals’ knowledge about safety regulations and 
their willingness to behave safely. The virtual environment testing scenarios can be used 
next to assess if individuals are able to apply their knowledge and willingness into practice. 
For example, individuals achieving good scores in compliance for the multiple choice test 
are believed to have sufficient knowledge about the rules and regulations. A virtual 
environment can then be used to assess how compliant these individuals are in following 
the rules and regulations in emergency conditions. Once the other behavioral indicators are 
assessed in the same way, unobservable PIFs can be assessed using the behavioral 
indicators. 
3.7 Limitation of the study 
There are a few limitations of the study that should be noted. First of all, it has to be 
considered that the virtual environment can provide a certain degree of realism and should 
not be expected to be an exact counterpart of real life emergency situations. Secondly, the 
evidence (i.e. questions or tasks) was not evenly distributed across behavioral indicators 
and this may have biased some of the results. For example, only one question (S3_Q6) was 
used to assess prioritization in the multiple choice test, whereas there were six questions to 
assess compliance. So, the assessment of prioritization may not be as robust as it should 
be. Having sufficient evidence for each indicator will increase the accuracy of the 
assessment. Thirdly, the study was designed to achieve three different research objectives 




or controlling of constraints in the study may have conditioned the performance of the 
participants in particular ways. An example could be the order of the multiple choice test 
and the virtual environment testing scenarios in each session. The participants had to 
complete the multiple choice test in advance of the testing scenarios. This order of testing 
meant that the feedback provided after multiple choice test may have influenced the score 
of the virtual environment testing scenario, which was not considered in the experimental 
design. An in-depth analysis was not performed to determine the effect of an individual’s 
prior video gaming experience on their testing scenario performance. The groups were 
balanced in terms of their self-reported video gaming experience, but it was not considered 
if the video gaming experience helped individuals get a better score in the virtual 
environment testing scenarios. Finally, the limited sample size might have imposed some 
constraints on the results and should be taken into consideration in future studies. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Though unobservable PIFs play an important role in shaping human performance, they are 
nearly impossible to measure. However, behavioral indicators associated with the 
unobservable PIFs are measurable and can help define the state of the unobservable PIFs. 
In this paper, a BN was first developed using the causal relationship between behavioral 
indicators and unobservable PIFs. The network was then extended by connecting each 
behavioral indicator with evidence variables. Conventional approaches for collecting this 
form of evidence involve using self-assessment multiple choice questionnaires. However, 
as reliable as these questionnaires may be, there is always the risk that the collected 




safely, instead of their actual behavior in emergency situations. This paper proposes the use 
of virtual environments along with the questionnaires to overcome this problem. 
 
Evidence was collected using both multiple choice tests and virtual environment testing 
scenarios in the experimental study presented in this paper. The comparison of outcomes 
of the two tests shows the difference between the individuals’ expected behavior and their 
actual behavior when placed in an emergency situation. A substantial number of 
participants who achieved a high score in the multiple choice test failed to demonstrate so 
in the virtual environment testing scenario. On the other hand, some participants who did 
not do well in the multiple choice test managed to demonstrate acceptable performance in 
the virtual environment testing scenarios. A combined testing approach including both 
multiple choice test and virtual environment test can help to ensure that participants have 
the required knowledge and the skill to apply the knowledge in emergency situations. A 
comparison between the two groups (G1: high level training and G2: low level training) 
shows that the highly trained group performed either better or equal in both multiple choice 
test and virtual environment testing scenarios. This indicates the benefit of advanced 
training in improving participants’ performance. 
 
Virtual environment scenarios are a closer representation of real life emergency situations 
when compared to a multiple choice test and can provide a better understanding of 




to offshore personnel and as a result can ensure better preparedness for personnel in real 
life emergency situations. 
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Offshore emergency conditions are dynamic in nature and personnel on board are 
challenged with high risk, time pressure, uncertainty, and the complexity of the situation. 
This paper investigates how different attributes of emergency scenarios influence people’s 
choice of egress route subsequent to training. An empirical study was carried out in a virtual 
environment (VE) with 17 naïve participants. The participants were trained to muster 
during emergencies using a lecture based training (LBT) approach. Training sessions in 
LBT consisted of computer based training tutorials and simulated training scenarios. 
Participants’ performance was then tested in simulated testing scenarios. It was observed 
that given the same training, people used different sets of attributes to make decisions on 
the egress route. This can help to diagnose causes of poor performance and to design 
adaptive training lessons. Such identification can also help in the assessment of the efficacy 
of the training curriculum, or the pedagogical approach.  
 
To evaluate the prediction accuracy of the decision trees, the outcomes were compared to 
the actual observed outcomes of the participants in scenarios in the testing data set. Results 
show an average of 95% prediction accuracy of the decision trees. 
4.1 Introduction 
Post-accident analyses of disasters like Piper Alpha and BP Deepwater Horizon show that 
the crises might have been managed more effectively if the personnel on board could take 
proper decisions and actions immediately (Flin, 1997). Being able to handle the remoteness 




information coming from different sources demand a high level of competency (Flin, 
Slaven, & Stewart, 1996). Virtual environments (VEs) in the offshore and maritime 
industries can help people gain such competency. VEs can be used to create artificial 
emergency scenarios with hazards such as fire, explosion, and blackouts, and to train 
individuals about their roles and responsibilities during an emergency (Veitch et al., 2008). 
During an emergency, the role of general personnel is to choose a tenable route to egress 
and muster at their designated muster stations. The focus of this paper is to discover egress 
strategies of individuals during emergency conditions after they have been trained in a VE 
(Smith et al., 2017). 
 
To this aim, an experimental study was conducted in a VE called All-hands Virtual 
Emergency Response Trainer (AVERT). AVERT is modeled after an offshore oil platform 
with high levels of detail and can create credible emergency scenarios ranging from muster 
drills to more complex scenarios where selected egress routes are blocked with hazards 
(House et al., 2014). 17 participants took part in the study with a goal to learn how to 
successfully muster during an offshore emergency situation. Participants were trained using 
a lecture based training (LBT) approach consisting of interactive video tutorials and 
simulated training scenarios. After training, participants performance’ was tested in 
multiple simulated testing scenarios.  Behavior of the participants were observed during 
both training and testing scenarios, and human performance data were collected. The 
collected data were divided into training and testing data sets. After feeding the training 




people use different attributes of emergency scenarios to choose an egress route. It was 
observed that even though the participants were exposed to the same training scenarios, on 
many occasions, they evidently comprehended the information provided in the scenarios 
differently. Thus, the characteristics of the attributes in a scenario can vary from individual 
to individual, and so can their decision trees (Joea & Boringa, 2014). 
 
Identifying route selection strategies can be useful to: 
• predict whether the participant will be able to successfully egress in a given context. 
• identify holes in the strategies that lead to poor performance (Elkind et al., 2014). 
Comparison of successful versus unsuccessful strategies may help to identify 
weaknesses of certain strategies and uncover ways to improve performance by adaptive 
training. 
• identify weaknesses of different pedagogical approaches and suggest possible 
improvements. Given proper training and repeated exposure to emergency scenarios, it 
is expected that the problem-solving strategies of individuals will converge and lead to 
success. If not, this can be an indication of weaknesses in the training curriculum or 
pedagogy.  
• train software agents or virtual operators so that they can reproduce similar or 





The decision trees were used to predict people’s performance in scenarios in the testing 
data set. Outcomes of the decision trees were compared to the observed outcome of the 
participants, thereby providing a basis to calculate the prediction accuracy of the trees. 
 
As the decision tree is at the core of the work presented in the paper, an overview of decision 
tree induction is presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the methodology and covers 
the major work done in the paper. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results. Section 
4.5 summarizes and concludes the findings.  
4.2 Overview of Decision tree induction 
Induction refers to the process involved in creating generalizations from the observed 
phenomenon (Badino, 2004). In inductive reasoning, inference leads from individual cases 
to general principles. Given a collection of training examples (condition 𝑥, action 𝑓(𝑥)) a 
hypothesis ℎ is generated that approximates the action 𝑓(𝑥) (Shaw et al., 1990). Among 
different induction techniques, decision tree induction is used in this paper. Decision tree 
offers a visual representation of the reasoning process and has valuable diagnostic 
capabilities. Compared to other methods, such as artificial neural networks or support 
vector machines, decision trees can be constructed relatively quickly. Another benefit of 
decision tree, which is particularly important for this paper, is that it does not require any 
prior assumptions about the data and can work with limited data compared to other 





The process of induction involves dividing the data cases into certain groups based on the 
value of a selected attribute, with the goal that the examples in any particular group will 
belong to the same class. One of the critical tasks of developing a tree is to select the best 
attribute to branch. Different decision tree algorithms (i.e. ID3, C4.5, CART) use different 
attribute selection measures such as information gain, gain ratio, and Gini index (Rokach 
& Maimon, 2014). As all attributes are categorical and there is no concern of missing data 
points, the ID3 decision tree algorithm is used in this paper. ID3 uses information gain for 
attribute selection (Han et al., 2011). 
 
Information gain is an attribute selection measure that is based on the concept of 
“information content" or the entropy of a message. The entropy of a random variable 𝑋 
measures the amount of uncertainty of 𝑋.  A small entropy implies low uncertainty. The 
idea is to partition data cases into groups such that entropy, and hence uncertainty, is 
minimized.  
 
Suppose there are 𝑚 distinct class labels, 𝐿1, 𝐿2, … , 𝐿𝑚. A random variable 𝑋 = 𝐿𝑖 if a 
randomly selected object from the entire population has label 𝐿𝑖. Given 𝑆 is the training 
set, and 𝑆𝑖 is the subset of objects in 𝑆 with the label 𝐿𝑖, 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝐿𝑖) can be calculated using 
equation 4.1. 
 
𝑃(𝑋 = 𝐿𝑖) ≈
|𝑆𝑖|
|𝑆|





Entropy of 𝑋 can then be computed as: 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 (𝑋) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝐿𝑖) 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝐿𝑖)
𝑚
𝑖=1





  𝑙𝑜𝑔2  
|𝑆𝑖|
|𝑆|
                (4.2) 
 
Now, suppose a data set 𝑆 is being partitioned using attribute 𝐴. 𝐴 is discrete and has 𝑘 
distinct values 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑘. Partitioning the data set on 𝐴 will result into 𝑘 data subsets, 
𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑘 where each 𝑆𝑗 contains data cases that have 𝐴 =  𝑎𝑗. The weighted average 
entropy across all 𝑆𝑗 can be calculated using equation 4.3. 






                                               (4.3) 
 
Entropy of all attributes can be measured in the same way. Entropy provides a ranking of 
the attributes given the training data cases. At any time, the attribute with the lowest entropy 
is chosen for partitioning. Or equivalently, the information gain of the attribute can be 
calculated as 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 (𝐴) = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑆) − 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 (𝐴), and the attribute with the highest 
gain can be selected for partition. 
 
Algorithm 4.1 summarizes the steps of inducing a decision tree from the training data set 






Algorithm 4.1: Basic algorithm for inducing a decision tree from a training data set 
Input: Training data set, Attribute list 
Output: A decision tree 
Method: 
Begin 
1. Create a node. 
2. If all examples at the current node are of the same class, then label the node with 
the class   and stop. 
3. If the data subset at the current node is empty, then label the node with the 
majority class label in its parent data set. 
4. If no attributes are left for further classification, then label the node with the 
majority class in the current data subset and stop. 
5. For each remaining attribute 𝐴𝑖, compute the value of information gain 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐴𝑖). 
6. Choose the attribute with the highest gain 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐴𝑖) to branch the current node. 




Figure 4.1 summarizes the steps followed to discover the route selection strategies of 
individuals in emergency situations. First, an experimental study was conducted in the VE 
with 17 participants. Participants were trained using a LBT approach and their performance 




and testing data sets. The training data were stored in a data repository in the form of a two-
dimensional matrix. This data matrix was used as input to the decision tree algorithm to 
identify the behavioral patterns of route selection. Section 4.3.1 describes the experimental 
design and data collection in detail. Section 4.3.2 discusses the development of the data 
matrices. Section 4.3.3 illustrates the development of the decision trees using the data 
matrices. The testing data set was used to assess the prediction accuracy of the decision 
trees. This is discussed separately in Section 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Steps to identify route selection strategies using experimental data 
4.3.1 Experimental design 
The data used in this paper were originally collected during an experimental study 




relevant to this paper is discussed here. More details can be found in Smith (2015) and 
Musharraf et al. (2016). 
 
A total of 36 participants took part in the study with the goal to learn how to muster 
successfully during offshore emergency situations. The participants were naïve concerning 
any detail of the experimental design, they were not employed in the offshore oil and gas 
industry, and therefore they were not familiar with the offshore platform. 17 randomly 
selected participants were given a higher level of training than the others, and only data 
collected from these participants are used in this paper. The participants were trained using 
a LBT approach consisting of 3 sessions. In the first session, they received a basic offshore 
emergency preparedness tutorial, 4 training scenarios, a multiple choice test, and 4 testing 
scenarios. In both Session 2 and Session 3, participants received an advanced training 
tutorial about alarms and hazards respectively, 4 additional training scenarios, a multiple 
choice test, and 4 testing scenarios. So, the participants had to perform in 24 scenarios in 
total. The purpose of the training scenarios was to provide participants exposure to the VE 
and emergency situations so that they could learn to choose an egress route and successfully 
muster at their designated muster stations. After the training phase, their performance was 
assessed in the testing scenarios. Though active feedback was not provided during the 
scenarios, an automated review of the performance was presented to the participants after 
each scenario. The review included several performance metrics, such as route selected for 




with hazards, and reporting at the muster stations. A total of 12 scenarios are analyzed in 
this paper for which the starting location was the cabin in the accommodation block.  
 
Videos of participants’ performance in the scenarios were recorded during the study for 
later data analysis. Observation logs were also kept by the investigators to record any 
observations about the participants’ behavior that was not captured by the video. The log 
also recorded any questions that participants asked during the study.  
4.3.2 Developing the data matrices 
Among the 12 scenarios, 8 scenarios were used to train the decision tree algorithm. Among 
the 4 remaining scenarios, 3 were used to test the prediction accuracy of the decision tree. 
The other scenario had to be excluded from the testing data set as the attribute values in 
this scenario were very different than the training scenarios and decision trees cannot make 
a prediction for attribute values they have not seen before. 
 
The training data were stored in a repository in the form of a matrix. Figure 4.2 shows an 
instance of the matrix. As shown in the figure, the matrix is two-dimensional, with 
scenarios as row heads (𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛), and attributes (𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑛) and associated actions 
(𝐸) as column heads. In general, attributes can be discrete or continuous. All attributes 







Figure 4.2: Data stored in the repository in the form of a two-dimensional matrix. 𝑺𝟏, 𝑺𝟐, … , 𝑺𝒏 
represent the scenarios, 𝑬𝟏, 𝑬𝟐, … , 𝑬𝒏 represent the associated actions, 𝑨𝟏, 𝑨𝟐, … , 𝑨𝒏 represent the 
attributes, 𝑽𝒊𝒋 represents the  𝒋
𝒕𝒉 value of the 𝒊𝒕𝒉 attribute (each attribute can take 𝒌 possible values) 
 
The attributes of different scenarios in this study were: Final destination, Lights, Presence 
of hazard, Alarm, Route direction in the PA, and Obstructed route. An additional attribute, 
Route taken in previous scenario, was considered to represent the participant’s chosen route 
in the preceding scenario. Table 4.1 shows the different possible values of each attribute. 
Table 4.1: Possible values of each attribute 
Attribute Possible values 
Final destination Muster station (MS), Lifeboat station (LB) 
Lights On, Off 
Presence of hazard Yes, No 
Alarm None, General platform alarm (GPA), 
Prepare to abandon platform alarm (PAPA) 
Route direction in the public address 
(PA) announcement 
None, Primary route, Secondary route 
Obstructed route None, Primary route, Secondary route 
Route taken in previous scenario None, Primary route, Secondary route 
  
In all of the scenarios, the participants started in their cabin and were asked to muster at 




secondary route) to get to the final destination from the cabin. Depending on the values of 
the attributes, participants had to choose a route to egress (i.e. IF obstructed route = primary 
route, THEN the route of choice should be secondary route). 
 
It has to be noted that even though the participants went through the same training and were 
exposed to the same scenarios, their understanding of the situations could be different. This 
means that even for the same scenario, characteristics of scenario attributes may vary from 
individual to individual. For example, suppose in a scenario the PA announcement is 
suggesting to take the primary route. For a participant who understood the PA, the value of 
the attribute Route direction in PA would be Primary route. However, for a participant who 
failed to understand the PA, the value of the same attribute could be None. The video files 
and information recorded in the observation logs were used by the investigators to interpret 
participants’ understanding of a scenario and assign the attribute values. This resulted in 
several different data matrices. Table 4.2 shows the data matrix for one sample participant. 
It includes both the training and testing scenarios from Session 1, and the training scenarios 
from Session 2 for a total of 6 data cases. 
 







Table 4.2: Data matrix at the end of training scenarios in Session 2 
Attributes Action 








LE2 MS On No None Primary  None N/A Primary 
LE3 LB Off No None Secondary None Primary Secondary 
TE1 LB On No None None None Secondary Primary 
TE3 MS Off No None None None Primary Primary 
LA2 MS Off No GPA None None Primary Primary 





4.3.3 Decision tree development 
Decision tree induction generates a decision tree from the data cases of known classes 
described in terms of a fixed set of attributes (Shaw et al., 1990). Given the data cases 
shown in Figure 4.2, the goal was to classify the cases into groups such that all examples 
in a group have the same choice of egress route. As discussed in Section 4.2, at any time 
‘t’ the classification is done using the attribute with highest information gain. Figure 4.3 
summarizes the process. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Classifying data cases shown in Figure 4.2 based on the characteristics of the attributes 
The data matrices generated in Section 4.3.2 were used as inputs to the decision tree 






Figure 4.4: Decision tree developed from the data matrix shown in Table 4.2 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the strategy of the participant is to listen to the PA announcement 
for route direction and choose a route accordingly. When no route direction is provided in 
the PA, the participant follows his/her preferred route which is the primary route. Strategies 
of the other participants can be discovered in the same way. 
 
The tree shown in Figure 4.4 can be used to predict the participant's performance in the 
testing scenarios in Session 2. Once a participant finishes performing in the testing 
scenarios, experiences from the scenarios are added to the data matrix for re-training a new 
tree to test the next session’s scenarios. 
 
As the participant moves into Session 3 and finishes performing the training scenarios, 
more content is added to the data matrix. This changes the decision tree as well. Table 4.3 
shows the state of the data matrix for the same participant after training in Session 3. Figure 
4.5 shows the corresponding decision tree. The tree shown in Figure 4.5 can be used to 
predict the participant’s performance in the testing scenarios in Session 3.  More on the 

















Choose route to 
egress 
LE2 MS On No None Primary None N/A Primary 
LE3 LB Off No None Secondary None Primary Secondary 
TE1 LB On No None None None Secondary Primary 
TE3 MS Off No None None None Primary Primary 
LA2 MS Off No GPA None None Primary Primary 
LA3 LB On No PAPA None None Primary Primary 
TA1 MS On No GPA None None Primary Primary 
TA3 LB Off No PAPA None None Primary Primary 
LH3 
(Frame 1) 
MS On No GPA None None Primary Primary 
LH3 
(Frame 2) 
MS On Yes GPA Secondary Primary Primary Secondary 
LH4 
(Frame 1) 
MS On No GPA None None Secondary Primary 
LH4 
(Frame 2) 
LB On Yes GPA None None Secondary Secondary 
LH4 
(Frame 3) 







Figure 4.5: Decision tree developed from the data matrix shown in Table 4.3 
 
It has to be noted that scenarios in Session 3 of the experiment were dynamic, and the value 
of the attributes changed during the scenarios. As shown in Table 4.3, these scenarios (i.e. 
LH3, LH4) were divided into frames such that in each frame the characteristics of the 
attributes remains static. The participant had to choose an egress route based on the value 
of the attributes in each frame. For example, in LH3, the participant started in his/her cabin 
when a GPA sounded and the PA announced that the platform is in alarm status. There was 
no indication of hazard or obstruction of any route in the PA. Based on the value of the 
attributes, the participant chose the primary route to egress at this time. This is the first 
frame of LH3. As the scenario progressed, the PA announced that there is a fire on the 




the presence of a hazard and indicated that the primary route was obstructed. Based on the 
changed values of the attributes, in Frame 2, the participant re-routed and took the 
secondary route to egress.  
 
This section discussed the data matrix and decision tree generation of one sample 
participant in detail. As discussed earlier in this section, the values of the attributes of the 
data matrix can vary from individual to individual and so can the decision trees. The 





4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Analysis of results 
Table 4.4 shows the different decision trees for all participants in the study. 
 
As shown, for 13 participants out of 17, the general understanding or strategy can be 
identified using a decision tree. For the remaining participants, the decision rules from the 
tree were the same as the ones in the data matrix and no generalization could be made. 
 
Given the training, it was expected that participants would be able to interpret the PA and 
choose an egress route based on the direction provided in the PA. Only 37% of the 
participants in Session 2 chose an egress route based on the route direction in PA. In Session 
3 this declined to 25%. As shown in Table 4.4, participants were using other attributes, 
such as final destination, previous route taken, and obstructed route, to choose an egress 
route. Using such attributes for route selection can lead to failure (i.e. interaction with 
hazard). It is possible to improve the training program so that such failure is eliminated and 






Table 4.4: Decision tree for 17 participants 
Participant 
No 
Decision Tree at the end of training in Session 2  
(No hazard) 

























Decision Tree at the end of training in Session 2  
(No hazard) 
Decision Tree at the end of training in Session 3  
(With Hazard) 







G1-13 At any condition: Choice of route = Secondary route 
 








Decision Tree at the end of training in Session 2  
(No hazard) 








As long as the participant understands PA, s/he follows the 
same decision tree. If the participant fails to understand PA, 
then s/he makes a choice based on obstructed route. In case PA 








Decision Tree at the end of training in Session 2  
(No hazard) 






Had a hard time with doors, so chose a route with fewer doors. Excluded from data set as the attribute is too specific for 




As the choice of route was random, decision tree does not give any more generalization than the data matrix. The decision 






4.4.2 Prediction accuracy 
The decision trees generated at the end of Session 2 were used to predict participants’ 
performance in the testing scenarios in Session 2. As the participants moved into Session 
3, the data matrices were re-trained and new examples were added. The updated decision 
trees were used to predict performance of the participants in the testing scenarios in Session 
3. The prediction accuracy of the trees was then calculated using equation 4.4. Table 4.5 
summarizes the result. 
 
(%)𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑛
𝑁
 × 100                                                    (4.4) 
 
Where 𝑛 = number of test scenarios for which (predicted outcome = observed outcome) 
    and 𝑁 =  total number of test scenarios 
Table 4.5: Classification accuracy of the decision trees 


















As shown in Table 4.5, the prediction accuracy of the decision trees is 95% on average. 
The trees predicted the performance of 11 participants with 100% accuracy (3 out of 3 
testing scenarios), and 2 participants with 67% accuracy (2 out of 3 testing scenarios). 
4.5 Limitations 
There are a few limitations with the study that need to be mentioned. First of all, VE can 
only provide a certain degree of realism and cannot be considered as an exact representation 
of the real world operating conditions. Secondly, the participants of the study were naïve. 
It is anticipated that repetition of the same experiment with real offshore workers would 
result in a different set of route selection strategies. Finally, the training and testing data set 
used in the paper is limited. The small training data set increases the possibility of 
overfitting. Future work will aim for a larger data set with balanced classes to improve the 
prediction accuracy. Another improvement in future works will be to use more advanced 
decision tree algorithms (e.g. C4.5 or C5) that support tree pruning to avoid overfitting. 
Two common approaches of tree pruning are: 1) Stop the growing phase at a certain point 
even if the halting conditions in the growing phase are not met, and 2) Let the tree grow to 
its fullest height in the growing phase but then remove leaves iteratively based on some 
criterion. More details on the pruning process can be found in Han et al. (2011). 
4.6 Conclusion 
Though extensive research has been done on human behavior in some industries, limited 
studies are available on behavioral representation of offshore workers (Sharma et al., 2008, 




presents a study that investigates peoples’ route selection behavior in offshore emergency 
situations after a targeted training program. The decision tree algorithm is used to identify 
peoples’ behavioral patterns during route selection. Results show that the trees can predict 
people’s choice of route in future emergency scenarios with an average of 95% accuracy. 
 
Identification of the route selection strategies can be useful in many ways. First, the 
decision trees can be used to predict the response of general personnel for a given situation. 
This can be extremely helpful in designing adaptive training so that individuals can reach 
competency faster. Next, the range of decision trees can help to detect the most effective 
strategy for a given situation. The ineffective strategies can be analyzed to see how and 
why they lead to poor performance, and find out ways of improvement. The identified 
strategies can also be used to assess the training curriculum and/or pedagogical approach. 
It is expected that a sound training process would ensure convergence to strategies that lead 
to success. Any systemic exception might be an indication of weakness of the training 
approach itself. Identifying and addressing of such weakness can yield better training 
curriculum or pedagogy. Finally, the strategies can be used to train human-like virtual 
operators. Virtual operators with different levels of skills (naïve versus expert) can be 
created by training them with different sets of strategies (successful versus erroneous). 
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The offshore oil industry functions in a team work culture, in which operations depend not 
only on individuals’ competency, but also on team skills. Team skills are even more 
necessary when it comes to handling emergency conditions as they challenge personnel on 
board with high risk, time pressure, and complexity. This raises the need for training that 
goes beyond conventional training programs and incorporates team skills exercises. The 
major difficulty to design such training is that it involves practicing emergency exercises 
with a potentially large number of participants. Such large-scale team exercises suffer from 
both organizational and educational drawbacks. One solution to this problem is to use 
artificial agents that can reproduce the behavior of the team members. This paper presents 
a behavior model that can simulate the response of general personnel during emergency 
situations. The variability in human behavior is modeled using different performance 
influencing factors (PIFs). Empirical evidence is used to identify the sources of variability 
that are encoded in the agents to allow a realistic range of human behaviors. Though 
variability can come from both physical and mental differences, the focus of this paper is 
on the later. Focus is given to across-subject variability rather than within-subject 
variability. 
5.1 Introduction 
The offshore oil industry functions in a team work culture and operations usually involve 
a group of people working together. This makes teamwork an essential component of 
effective emergency responses. Members of a team not only need to understand their own 




responsibilities of the other team members. Such understanding is critical for emergency 
situations as most of the members will have different roles and responsibilities than their 
everyday duties (Flin, 1997). However, traditional training programs are often generic and 
are not designed to provide trainees with the understanding of social and cognitive aspects 
of effective team work. 
 
O'Connor & Flin (2003) discuss the possibility of adopting the crew resource management 
technique, pioneered in the aviation industry, in offshore oil industries to enhance team 
performance. Crew resource management (CRM) is defined as “using all the available 
resources – information, equipment, and people – to achieve safe and efficient flight 
operations” (Moffat & Crichton, 2015). A significant part of the CRM training requires the 
trainees to participate in team training exercises using simulator flights. Organizing such 
team exercises for offshore industries may suffer from both organizational and educational 
drawbacks (Van Diggelen et al., 2010). Gathering all the team members at the same time 
and at the same location itself is a challenge. Even when it is possible, the financial 
requirement is high. Also, the members often have different training needs based on their 
competency levels. One solution to this problem is to develop a team training platform in 
a simulator where the roles of some of members are played by humans, while the roles of 
others are played by artificial intelligent agents (Van Diggelen et al., 2010). Though 
extensive research has been done to create artificial intelligent agents in military (Jones et 
al., 1999; Sampson & Ripingill Jr, 2003; Wray & Laird, 2003), aviation (McNally, 2005; 




Dang, 1996) training simulators, no such model is available to date for offshore emergency 
training simulators. 
 
This paper presents a computational human behavior simulation model (HBM), which is 
the first step to create such intelligent agents for an offshore emergency training simulator. 
Realism of agents largely depends on their underlying HBMs.  HBMs are computational 
models that probabilistically simulate human behavior in different conditions. The purpose 
of the HBM presented in this paper is to reproduce the behavior of people working on 
offshore petroleum platforms, general personnel in particular, during emergency situations.  
 
Unlike other human behavior models, the proposed model considers a larger fraction of the 
possible behavior space, which includes both correct and incorrect behaviors (Wray & 
Laird, 2003; McNally, 2005). Different performance influencing factors (PIFs) are used to 
model the variability across the behavior space. As use of subject matter experts’ (SMEs’) 
opinion often leads to a less reliable model (Chang & Mosleh, 2007c), empirical evidence 
is used in the development of the HBM. To this end, a two-level, three factor experiment 
was conducted to observe the influence of different PIFs on emergency response. Earlier 
works of the authors have discussed in detail the underlying mathematical models that 
capture the impact of external (Musharraf et al., in press) and internal PIFs (Musharraf et 
al., 2016) on human performance. Details of the learning and decision making process of 
individuals have been discussed in (Musharraf et al., 2017b). The goal of this paper is to 




discussed in previous papers to produce automated probabilistic simulation of offshore 
workers’ response under the pressure of an emergency. Prior to implementing the HBM in 
the actual simulator, it is modeled in the Integrated Performance Modeling Environment 
(IPME) simulation framework to define the implementation work scope and identify the 
technical challenges. Example results generated by the HBM during an IPME scenario 
simulation are discussed in this paper. Implementation of the HBM in the training simulator 
and validation of the HBM are discussed separately in (Musharraf et al., 2017). 
5.2 Overview of the HBM 
Modeling human behavior is a challenging area of research that needs considerations of 
both modeling and simulation, and behavioral and cognitive psychology (Goerger et al., 
2005). There are qualitative models that focus mostly on the behavioral and cognitive 
psychology, and describe in detail the evolution of the human cognition process upon 
receiving an external stimulus from the environment (Trucco & Leva, 2007). Then, there 
are quantitative models that are based on the structure of the qualitative ones, but focus on 
the computational functionalities of modeling and simulation (Chang & Mosleh, 2007a). 
The HBM presented in this paper is a computational behavior simulation model that is a 
simplification of complex environmental settings and complex cognitive processes of 
human operators. 
 
Section 5.2.1 introduces the different components of the HBM model. Section 5.2.2 
describes how knowledge gained from training and experience is stored and retrieved 




5.2.1 Dynamic response model 
The dynamic response model consists of four component models – an environment model, 
an operator model, a performance shaping model, and a task network model (after Chang 
& Mosleh, 2007a). The dynamic response model presented in this paper looks at individuals 
in isolation. Collaboration of team members and the concept of shared situation awareness 
is out of scope of this paper. 
 
Environment model: The environment model includes external factors that define the 
circumstances or environment in which the individual is situated. This allows modeling 
human response under different environment conditions. External factors in the 
environment model include team-related factors (e.g. communication availability and 
quality, team composition), organization factors (e.g. safety and quality culture, procedure 
availability, adequacy, and quality), environment factors (e.g. temperatures, visibility), and 
conditioning events (e.g. latent failures) (Chang & Mosleh, 2007b). 
 
Operator model: The operator model defines the characteristics of an operator in terms of 
internal factors. In the context of this paper, operator refers to general personnel working 
on offshore petroleum platforms. Though internal factors include both physical and non-
physical attributes of the operator, this paper focuses on non-physical attributes only. The 
operator model allows modeling operators who may have different responses given the 
same environmental condition. Examples of internal factors used in the operator model 




Task networking model: Task network modeling focuses on understanding the tasks that 
need to be simulated. The task network model graphically represents the sequence of tasks 
performed by an operator. Operators’ behavior generally consists of different interrelated 
cognitive functions (Trucco & Leva, 2007). This paper considers four cognitive functions 
performed by the general personnel: perception, interpretation, decision making, and 
execution. Any function is decomposed into a series of sub functions, which in turn are 
decomposed into tasks for the development of the task network. Failure can happen at any 
stage of performing a task. Also, there can be more than one correct behavior or way to 
fail. The task network helps to identify possible deviations from the ideal behavior path(s) 
that may lead to error. 
 
Performance shaping model: This model includes a set of performance shaping functions 
(PSFs). The PSFs generate the rules of behavior that govern the performance of general 
personnel while performing cognitive tasks. The response of general personnel depends on 
the state of the operator (e.g. stress, task related and non-task related load) and the current 
state of knowledge (e.g. scenario based knowledge from training and experience). The PSFs 
take the state of the operator and current state of knowledge into account and generate the 
associated operator response for a given set of PIFs. The PSFs used in the HBM 
development process are defined using a Bayesian Network (BN) approach. BNs have 
proven to be a powerful modeling tool due to their capability to 1) consider dependency 
among PIFs and associated actions, 2) quantify the impact of different PIFs on successful 




becomes available (Fenton & Neil, 2012; Podofillini & Dang, 2013; Sundaramurthi & 
Smidts, 2013). BNs have been widely used to model the impact of different PIFs on human 
performance or human error (Baraldi et al., 2009; Dang & Stempfel, 2012). Details of the 
PSF development is discussed in Section 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the interaction between the external world and the component models. At 
any time ‘t’ the state of PIFs in the environment model and operator model are defined 
based on the events happening in the external world. The state of the internal and external 
factors defines the operator’s state of mind. The PIFs also influence how information is 
memorized from training and experience, and retrieved when necessary. The PSF model 
takes the operator’s state of mind and current state of knowledge into account, and 






Figure 5.1: Dynamic response model 
5.2.2. Memory structure and cognitive functions 
This section describes the memory structure and the cognitive functions as part of the HBM. 
The HBM used here simplifies the complex memory and cognitive processes of human 
operators. 
 
 The purpose of the HBM presented in this paper is to create intelligent agents for an 
offshore emergency training simulator. It is assumed that these agents’ response to 




A database representative of human memory is created in the HBM. The two main 
components of the memory structure are knowledge base and working memory, which are 
modeled based on the idea of long-term and short-term memory in the information 
processing model of Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968). According to the information processing 
model, memory consists of several ‘stores’ with different storage capacity. In the proposed 
HBM, the working memory has a finite capacity and stores the information relevant to the 
current cognitive process. The knowledge base has a theoretically infinite capacity and 
stores all the knowledge gained through training and experience.  
 
A reasoning module, or inference engine, is added in the HBM to model the agents’ 
reasoning process (after Li, 2013). Among different reasoning approaches, inductive 
reasoning is used (Li & Mosleh, in press). In inductive reasoning, generalizations are 
created from observed phenomena or principles. Decision tree induction is used in the 
HBM development (Musharraf et al., 2017b). Decision tree offers a visual representation 
of the reasoning process and has useful diagnostic capabilities. Compared to other methods, 
such as artificial neural networks, or support vector machines, decision trees can be 
constructed relatively quickly. Other benefits of decision trees are that they do not require 
any prior assumptions about the data, and can work with limited data compared to other 
techniques (Duffy, 2008). More on decision tree and its benefits can be found in Han et al. 
(2011). To make information retrieval fast and easier, besides reasoning, the inference 
engine in the HBM has the added functionality of storing the created generalizations once 





Figure 5.2: HBM main components of memory structure, reasoning module, and their interaction 
during the cognitive process 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the interaction among the components of memory structure and reasoning 
module during the cognitive process. At the beginning of the cognitive process, cues are 
perceived from the environment. The perceived cues are interpreted to form a calling 
condition. A calling condition is a set of variables that takes values from a defined set 
(Thow-Yick, 1994). If a solution to the current calling condition is available in the working 
memory, it is immediately retrieved. Otherwise, the calling condition is transferred to the 
inference engine to find a solution. If a decision rule that matches the current calling 
condition is found, the solution is retrieved and sent to the working memory to act upon. If 




Higher level analogy of the calling condition may be used at this stage to find a solution in 
the knowledge matrix. Once a solution is found, the next step is to execute a series of 
actions to implement it. 
5.3 Case study: HBM for general personnel 
This paper aims to develop an HBM for general personnel in the context of offshore 
emergencies. General personnel are individuals whose responsibility during an emergency 
is to follow the alarm(s) and public address (PA) announcement(s), and muster at their 
designated muster stations. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, the focus of the HBM presented 
in this section is to reproduce behavior of individuals in isolation. Collaboration and shared 
situation awareness among team members are not considered at this stage. 
 
The HBM presented in this paper uses empirical evidence. An experimental study was done 
to 1) populate the knowledge base, 2) define the inference process, and 3) investigate the 
influence of different PIFs on task performance. For clarity, only the part of the 
experimental study that is relevant to this paper will be discussed here. More details can be 
found in Smith (2015) and Musharraf et al. (2016). 
 
The experiment was conducted using a virtual environment. A virtual environment is a 
computer aided simulation environment that allows trainees to gain artificial experience, 
including in dangerous scenarios. The virtual environment used in the case study is called 
the all-hands virtual emergency response trainer (AVERT). AVERT was designed to 




with high levels of detail and can create credible emergency scenarios by introducing 
hazards such as blackouts, fires, and explosions.  
 
A total of 36 participants took part in the experimental study with a goal to learn how to 
muster during offshore emergency situations. Samples of convenience method was 
followed for participant recruitment (Ritter et al., 2012). Majority of the participants were 
university students. The participants were naïve concerning any detail of the experimental 
design, they were not employed in the offshore oil industry, and they were not familiar with 
the offshore platform. Among the 36 participants, 27 were males and 9 were females. The 
age range of the participants was 19-39 years, with a mean of 26.5 years and standard 
deviation of 4.4 years. 
 
For the case study, the participants had to go through a range of offshore muster scenarios, 
from drills that required the participants to go to their primary muster station, to more 
complex emergency scenarios that required the participants to avoid hazards blocking their 
egress routes and muster at their lifeboat stations (House et al., 2014). The scenarios did 
not directly induce any operator state. Rather, the scenarios were designed such that the 
effect of different PIFs on individuals’ performance during offshore emergency situations 
can be investigated.  The underlying assumption is that the state of the PIFs implicitly 
induces a certain operator state. For example, consider a highly complex scenario where a 
participant’s preferred route is blocked by a hazard, there is a blackout due to the hazard, 




is extensive. It is expected that this situation will induce a stressed state and high mental 
load (both task related and task non-related). More details on the different PIFs are 
discussed in subsections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
 
As stated in section 5.2.1, the four major cognitive functions considered in this paper are 
perception, interpretation, decision making, and execution. During the scenarios, the 
participants had to perceive the audio-visual cues provided through alarms and PA 
announcements. Next, the participants had to analyze the cues and interpret what the alarms 
and PA announcements mean (i.e. which route is obstructed, what is the recommended 
muster location). Once the participants were aware of the situation, they needed to evaluate 
the potential routes and choose a route to egress. Finally, the participants had to move along 
the egress route following all safety procedures (i.e. not running, and closing all 
fire/watertight doors). They needed to reach the muster location in a timely manner and 
muster there. More details on the task performed by general personnel is discussed in 
section 5.3.4. 
 
Several performance metrics of the participants were recorded during each scenario. The 
metrics include: time to muster, time spent running, interaction with fire doors and 
watertight doors, interaction with hazards, and reporting at different muster locations. The 





The following sections illustrate how the HBM presented in section 5.2 can be applied to 
model the behavior of general personnel in offshore emergency situations using the 
experimental data. Section 5.3.1 discusses how knowledge gained from training is stored 
in the memory.  Section 5.3.2 to 5.3.5 discuss the different components of the response 
model. 
5.3.1 Knowledge acquisition and storage 
During the study, all participants were provided with some level of training (different 
training types are discussed in section 5.3.2). The knowledge participants gained from the 
training tutorials and scenarios was stored in the knowledge base in the form of a two-
dimensional matrix. The inference engine used the decision tree induction to identify the 
general principles or problem-solving strategies based on the individual cases in the 
knowledge matrix. The knowledge matrix and the decision rules together form the current 
state of knowledge (Musharraf et al., 2017b). Knowledge acquisition and information 
retrieval are influenced by the state of the PIFs in the environmental model and operator 
model. 
5.3.2 Environmental model 
The environmental model focuses on external factors that define the situation. The external 
factors used in the experiment were training, visibility, and complexity. 
 
A total of 36 participants took part in the study. Each participant was randomly assigned to 




Both groups received a basic offshore emergency preparedness training. G1 received 
additional training tutorials and simulated training scenarios regarding situational 
awareness, alarms, PA announcements, and hazards. Performance of participants in both 
groups was subsequently tested using simulated testing scenarios. 
 
In the simulated scenarios, visibility was varied at two different levels: clearly visible and 
blackout. In clearly visible conditions, there was enough ambient light to perform the 
assigned task. In the blackout conditions, the visibility was reduced by reducing the 
available ambient light. However, the participants could use a virtual flashlight in the 
blackout conditions to have functional visibility. 
 
Complexity was also varied at two different levels: low and high. In low complexity 
conditions, there was no obstacle in the preferred evacuation route, and the responsibility 
assigned to the participant was minimal. High complexity situations were created by 
blocking the escape routes with hazards (i.e. smoke, fire, and explosion), and assigning 
more responsibilities to the participants. Complexity of the situation was also reflected in 
the alarm (static versus dynamic) and PA (direct versus indirect). To summarize, 
complexity was defined in terms of alarm, PA, presence of hazard, obstruction of routes, 
and amount of responsibility assigned to the participant. For the rest of the paper, these 




5.3.3 Operator model 
The operator model focuses on the internal PIFs. It was observed during the study that 
given the same environmental conditions, participants’ response to an emergency may vary 
depending on the internal PIFs. The internal PIFs assessed in the experiment were 
knowledge, bias, information use, compliance, and prioritization. 
 
People learn and retain information differently, so given the same training, may have 
differences in knowledge. This difference is reflected in their problem-solving strategies. 
It is observed in the experimental data that even participants in the same training group had 
different knowledge-matrices and hence different strategies for solving problems 
(Musharraf et al., 2017b). 
 
Bias can be defined as “the tendency of a human to make conclusions based on selected 
pieces of information while excluding information that does not agree with the conclusion" 
(Groth & Mosleh, 2012). While some participants were biased and inclined to previous 
experience, some were not. The information use measures an individual’s effectiveness in 
using information presented to him/her. Individuals may favor some information over 
others due to bias. Some participants showed better information use efficacy than others. 
Prioritization is how an individual orders assigned tasks, or the goals that are to be 
achieved. Some participants prioritized personal safety over notifying others about the 




established by the organization or the industry. Some participants were safety compliant 
and followed the regulations. Others failed to follow the safety regulations while mustering. 
 
5.3.4 Task networking model 
Figure 5.3 shows the task network of general personnel during offshore emergency 
situations. To exploit the benefits of standard modeling, the task network is presented in 
the form of an activity diagram in Unified Modeling Language (UML). Activity diagrams 
are graphical representations of workflows of stepwise activities and actions and serve the 
same purpose as task network for the case study (Dumas & Ter Hofstede, 2001). 
 
Figure 5.3 captures the main tasks done by general personnel during offshore emergencies. 
Besides the standard sequence of tasks, erroneous deviations at decision points are shown 
in the figure using dashed lines. In addition to the decision points, errors can also happen 
at the following task nodes: 
a) Identify alarm and interpret PA – Some participants failed to identify the alarm and 
consequently went to the wrong final destination. These participants ended up 
registering at the wrong muster location. Some participants also failed to interpret the 
PA and misunderstood the presence and/or location of the hazard and obstruction of 
routes. 




c) Move along selected egress route – Some participants ran along the egress route instead 
of walking. Participants were trained to close fire/watertight doors while moving along 
the egress route, but some participants failed to close the doors while egressing. 
d) Evaluation of egress paths – In each scenario, participants had to choose an egress route 
from a set of potential routes. Based on the location of the hazard, some routes may not 
be safe and must be avoided. Some participants failed to correctly evaluate the egress 
routes and chose a route that was not tenable. Failure at this node largely depends on 









5.3.5 Performance shaping model 
As shown in the task network in Figure 5.3, at some decision nodes there are possible 
deviations from the standard behavior path. PSFs define the probabilities of such erroneous 
deviations. PSFs also define the failure probability at the task nodes mentioned in Section 
5.3.4.  
 
For example, during the training, the participants were trained to identify different alarms. 
Based on the training, the following alarm identification rule will be stored in the memory: 
two tone sound is a General Platform Alarm (GPA); constant tone sound is a Prepare to 
Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA). During an emergency scenario, based on the state of the 
PIFs, a participant may retrieve and use the alarm identification rule correctly, or can make 
a mistake and misinterpret the alarm. The PSFs compute the probability of making such an 
error. They take the PIFs as inputs and uses a BN approach to compute the human error 
probability. 
 
BNs are acyclic directed graphical models that represent conditional dependencies among 
a set of random variables Pearl (1988). While performing a task or exercise, errors can 
occur at different steps of the process. Each error is regarded as the outcome of the joint 
influence of different PIFs (as depicted in Figure 5.4). In the BN approach, error is the 
critical node, which depends on several PIFs that can influence the occurrence of the error. 
For example, misinterpretation of alarm may happen because the knowledge of the 




(PIF2), or both. Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between human error and PIFs. More 
detail on the BN development and probability calculation can be found in Musharraf et al. 
(2016) and Musharraf et al. (in press). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Human error while performing a task is the outcome of joint influence of PIF1 to PIFn 
(Musharraf et al., in press) 
 
5.4 Simulation of the developed HBM 
The purpose of the proposed HBM is to create human-like agents in the AVERT simulator 
enable team training. Before integrating the HBM into the agents in AVERT, the HBM was 
modeled in the IPME simulation framework to clearly define the implementation work 
scope and identify the technical challenges. During the experimental study, variability 
across participants was observed in terms of behavior (correct versus erroneous). Based on 
the aggregated score participants received in the scenarios, they can be classified into 3 




capture the same variability in agents, 3 types of operators were created using the HBM. 
The internal PIFs were used to encode the across-subject variability. Table 5.1 summarizes 
the internal PIF settings for the different types of operators. 
Table 5.1: Internal PIF settings for the different types of operators 
Operator type Internal PIF settings 
Competent 
operator 
Knowledge = High, Bias = Low, Compliance = High, Efficacy of 
information use = High, Prioritization = Right 
Naïve operator 
Knowledge = Low, Bias = High, Compliance = Low, Efficacy of 
information use = Low, Prioritization = Wrong 
In-between 
operator 
In-between operators are representative of the behavior range 
between the two extremes of competent and naïve, and can be 
created by using different combinations of internal PIF values. 
Since efficacy of information use was found to be one of the most 
influential factors (Musharraf et al., 2016), a sample in-between 
operator was created with efficacy of information use as low and all 
other PIFs in optimal setting. 
Knowledge = High, Bias = Low, Compliance = High, Efficacy of 
information use = Low, Prioritization = Right 
 
Section 5.4.1 discusses the probabilistic response generation for different types of operator 
using an example. Some sample equations, functions, and user interface screens are 




5.4.1 Probabilistic response generation 
During any emergency scenario, the operators would need to perform the tasks summarized 
in Figure 5.3 as required. Depending on the state of the PIFs, the operators would either 
perform the task correctly or make an error. Section 5.3.4 discussed the potential errors. 
Probability of such error happening is calculated using a BN informed by the empirical 
data. To demonstrate the probabilistic response generation, a task node “Move along egress 
route while closing all fire/watertight doors” is used here as an example. In emergency 
situations, competent operators are expected to exhibit safe behavior and close all 
fire/watertight doors, whereas the in-between and naïve operators might deviate from the 
safe behavior and leave fire/watertight doors open. Figure 5.5 shows the BN that captures 
the causal dependency among the internal PIFs (knowledge, compliance) and human error 
(leaving fire/watertight doors open). 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Causal dependency among the internal PIFs (knowledge, compliance) and human error 
(leaving fire/watertight doors open). A comprehensive BN with all PIFs and all potential errors can 





Empirical data collected during the study were used to assess participants’ internal PIFs. 
The assessment helped to inform the conditional probabilities in Figure 5.5. For example, 
participants with both high knowledge and high compliance had lower error probability 
(25%) than participants who had one (50%) or none (95%).  More details on this can be 
found in Musharraf et al. (2016). The same idea was used to simulate the behaivor of 
different operator types. For the competent operators, the internal PIFs are in ideal settings, 
which means they will have a lower proability of error. For the naïve and in-between 
operators, the internal PIFs are in non-optimal or sub-optimal states and this increases their 
probaiblity of error.  
 
The different types of operators were tested in several scenarios. Simulation results for a 
sample emergency scenario are summarized in the following subsections. In the scenario, 
there is a fire on the helideck that signals an alarm with a flashing green light and a two-
tone sound. The participants must go to their muster station. The PA directs participants to 
use the primary route. None of the egress routes are obstructed. Values of external PIFs are 
set per scenario prior to simulation.  
 
It has to be noted that the HBM is stochastic and even for the same combination of PIFs 
(both external and internal), the behavior of operators may vary across repeated simulation 
runs. The most frequently observed simulated behaviors of a competent operator, a naïve 
operator, and an in-between operator over 30 simulation runs of the same scenario are 




5.4.2 Competent operator 
It was observed during the simulation that the operator successfully interpreted the audio-
visual cues. The alarm type was correctly identified as the general platform alarm (GPA), 
and final destination was set to muster station. The operator also understood the PA clearly 
and followed the route direction given in the PA, which was the primary route. The operator 
walked while moving along the egress route and closed all fire and watertight doors. 
5.4.3 Naïve operator 
The naïve operator failed to interpret the alarm and the PA. The alarm was mistaken as a 
prepare to abandon platform alarm (PAPA) and the final destination was set as lifeboat 
station, which was incorrect. While choosing an egress route, the operator did not pay 
attention to the PA, rather went with the route s/he was most familiar with, which was the 
secondary route. The operator ran along the egress route and did not close the fire or 
watertight doors. 
5.4.4 In-between operator 
The in-between operator interpreted the alarm and PA correctly and set the final destination 
as the muster station. However, as the operator’s efficacy of information use was low, s/he 
did not choose a route based on the PA. His/her strategy was to choose an egress route 
based on the final destination (take the primary route if the final destination is the muster 
station and try the secondary route in case the final destination is the lifeboat station). 
Though the strategy led the operator to the correct choice of route in this particular scenario, 




The operator walked while moving along the egress route and closed all fire and watertight 
doors.  
 
Figure 5.6 summarizes the observed erroneous behavior of different operator types over 30 
simulation runs. As shown in Figure 5.6, the naïve operators exhibit the most erroneous 
behavior. The competent operators and in-between operators occasionally commit errors, 
but at a much lower rate compared to the naïve operators. One of the commonly observed 
errors in the ideal operators was leaving fire/watertight doors open under the pressure of 
emergency. This was also one of the most frequent mistakes by participants with high 
performance scores (80-100%). 
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As demonstrated by the results, the HBM is capable of modeling the across-subject 
variability, which will enable the creation of a heterogeneous training environment where 
each entity behaves somewhat differently. Training programs in AVERT can benefit from 
this. It will prepare the trainee for the variability that is inherent in human teammates. 
Trainees can gain experience of working with or commanding teams with varying skill 
levels. Variability can also help to keep the trainee more engaged during the simulation 
training by offering novel challenging situations. 
5.5 Conclusion and future work 
This paper presents a computational model of human behavior during offshore emergency 
situations. To understand the emergency response of general personnel, an experimental 
study was conducted using a virtual environment. The variability observed across scenarios 
was captured in the computational model using external PIFs. To encode the variability 
observed across different scenarios, external PIFs were used. To encode the variability 
observed across different subjects given the same scenario, internal PIFs were used. 
Simulation results show that the model can capture human behavior variability given 
different states of PIFs.   
 
 The next step is to integrate the HBM in AVERT to create intelligent agents. Results from 
the IPME simulation framework will guide the integration and implementation process. 
Validation of the HBM is out of the scope of this paper and is presented separately in 
Musharraf et al. (2017). The work on validation illustrates how the simulated behaviors 
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With the advancement of simulation-based training, intelligent agents that can display 
human-like behavior have become common. From military combat simulations to nuclear 
power plant simulation, agents have been widely used to facilitate team training (as team 
mates, opponents, or both). Credibility of these agents is vital to ensure a sound training 
process. Credibility of the agents largely depends on the credibility of the underlying 
human behavior representation model (HBM). This is why validation of the HBM is 
necessary to ensure realistic agent behavior. However, the non-deterministic nature of the 
HBM and the subjectivity in experts' judgment during the validation process make HBM 
validation more challenging compared to physics based models. This paper presents the 
validation process of an HBM of general personnel created for use in an offshore 
emergency training simulator. Three types of agents (naïve, in-between, and ideal) are 
created in the simulator using the HBM.  The paper discusses the use of empirical evidence 
as referents, along with subject matter experts (SME). A two-level three factor experiment 
was conducted using 36 participants. Several performance metrics were collected during 
the experiment, including route selected for evacuation, time to muster, time spent running, 
interaction with fire doors and watertight doors, interaction with hazards, and reporting to 
the muster station. Data collected during the experimental study have been used in this 
paper to demonstrate how the use of empirical evidence can facilitate HBM validation. 
High-level tasks performed during HBM validation are discussed in detail. Special 
emphasis is given on acceptability criteria testing to ensure that the HBM performs 




meets the acceptability criteria requirement for all types of agents. In general, the ideal 
agents exhibited safe behavior during offshore emergency egress, whereas the naïve and 
in-between agents showed erroneous behavior at times. For example, during the simulation 
runs of a critical emergency scenario where the primary egress route was obstructed by a 
hazard, the ideal agents either waited and listened to the public address (PA) announcement 
and followed an alternative egress route (60% cases), or they initially chose their preferred 
route but re-routed immediately after encountering the hazard (40% cases). In all cases, the 
in-between agents started with their preferred route and re-routed after encountering the 
hazard, and the naïve agents proceeded with their preferred route even when the route was 
compromised.  
6.1 Introduction 
Software agents, or computer generated forces (CGFs), are extensively used in a wide range 
of team training simulations. This includes military applications for training and rehearsal 
for combat situations (Karr et al., 1997). The use of virtual crew is also common in aviation 
and nuclear power plant simulation training (Chang & Mosleh, 2007). Realism of agents in 
any platform largely depends on the sophistication of the underlying human behavior 
representation model (HBM) (Smith, 1998). HBMs are computational models that 
probabilistically simulate human behavior in different conditions. To ensure agents have 
an acceptable level of credibility, the underlying HBM must be validated. However, due to 
the non-deterministic nature of the HBM, it is difficult to ensure that the HBM adequately 
represents the behavior it was designed to exhibit, and captures the behavior variability 




The difficulty has led face validation to become the most common form of validation for 
HBM (Anon., 2001b). Face validation is a method that is widely used to validate interactive 
real-time virtual simulations where user interaction bears significant importance for the 
simulation to be accredited (Sokolowski & Banks, 2010). As defined in the Defense 
Modeling and Simulation Office's (DMSO) Recommended Practices Guide (RPG), “in face 
validation technique, a subject matter expert (SME) drives through the scenario space by 
issuing commands or changing the simulating situation, observes the resulting behavior, 
and determines, often qualitatively, whether that behavior meets a user’s requirements for 
realism”. Face validation is listed as the least reliable and least completed HBM validation 
process (Anon., 2001b). SMEs’ judgments are drawn mostly from their own experience 
and can be biased. It is also hard to ensure their levels of consistency and accuracy when 
evaluating human performance versus simulated human behavior. 
 
This paper presents the HBM validation of general personnel created to be used in an 
offshore emergency preparedness training simulator. The simulator is called the all-hands 
virtual emergency response trainer (AVERT). It is modeled after an offshore oil platform 
with high levels of graphical detail of the environment and can create credible emergency 
scenarios by introducing hazards such as blackouts, fires, and explosions. The current 
configuration of AVERT is intended to train general personnel in safe work practices 
(Smith et al., 2017). As of now, only individual training is enabled in AVERT. The HBM 
of the general personnel is the first step towards creating software agents to enable team 




sound team training process, the model must be validated before use. This paper describes 
the high-level tasks performed to validate the model. Besides SMEs' judgments, empirical 
evidence is used in this paper during the validation process. 
 
Figure 6.1 summarizes the previous work leading to validation. An experimental study was 
conducted in AVERT to gather empirical evidence for – 1) an HBM development and 2) 
the HBM validation. Details of the HBM development have been discussed in Musharraf 
et al. (2017). The focus of the paper is the latter. Before going into the details of the 
validation process, Section 6.2 gives an overview of the experimental study and the HBM. 
Section 6.3 discusses the validation process in detail. Special attention is paid in this paper 
to the result validation. Section 6.4 lists the challenges faced during the validation. Section 
6.5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Data collected during an experimental study conducted in AVERT were divided into two 





6.2 Overview of the experimental study and HBM  
6.2.1 Experimental study 
This section provides an overview of the experimental study and the HBM of general 
personnel in the context of offshore emergencies. General personnel are individuals whose 
responsibility during an emergency is to muster at their designated muster stations (Smith 
et al., 2017).  
 
The experiment was conducted using the AVERT simulator. A total of 36 participants took 
part in the study, each with the goal to learn how to successfully muster during offshore 
emergency situations. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two groups 1) 
G1: high level training, or 2) G2: low level training. The sample size was determined by an 





                                                            (1) 
 
Here, 𝑛 is the sample size, 𝑡𝛼/2 is the t-score for a 95% confidence interval, σ is the 
estimated standard deviation informed by a prior study (Bradbury-Squires, 2013), and 𝐵 is 
the acceptable margin of error. Originally, a sample of 40 participants was targeted for a 
confidence interval of 95% where a margin of error of (+/-) 10% was considered acceptable. 
As the study investigated the effect of training, a minimum of 15 participants in each 
training group was required. From the original recruitment, 4 participants withdrew for 




error to (+/-) 11%. 17 participants were assigned to G1, and 19 participants were assigned 
to G2. A more detailed discussion on the sample size can be found in Smith (2015).  
 
Among the 36 participants, 27 were males and 9 were females. The age range was from 19 
to 39 years. Participants were recruited using samples of convenience (Ritter et al., 2012). 
Naïve participants, mostly university students, were recruited for the study. The 
participants were not aware of any detail of the experimental design, they were not 
employed in the offshore oil industry, and therefore they were not familiar with the offshore 
platform.  
 
Each participant attended 3 sessions on 3 separate days. Both groups received basic 
offshore emergency preparedness training in session 1. G1 then received 4 practice 
scenarios in the same session. In session 2 and session 3, G1 received additional training 
tutorials and practice scenarios (4 scenarios per session) regarding situation awareness, 
alarms, public address (PA) announcements, and hazards. G2 did not receive any further 
training or practice opportunities in session 2 and 3. Performance of participants in both 
groups was tested in each session using 4 test scenarios. In total, participants in G1 
performed in 24 scenarios and participants in G2 performed in 12 scenarios. 
 
 The simulated scenarios ranged from drills that required the participants to go to their 
primary muster station, to more complex emergency scenarios that required the participants 




al., 2014). Appendix B includes the schematic diagrams of different egress routes. The 
scenarios were designed such that the effect of different performance influencing factors 
(PIFs) on individuals’ performance during offshore emergency situations could be 
investigated. PIFs are factors that can specifically decrement or improve human 
performance during a task (e.g. complexity, visibility) (Blackman et al., 2008). PIFs are 
also referred to as behavior moderators. 
 
Besides training, the other two external PIFs investigated in the study are visibility and 
complexity. Both visibility and complexity were varied into two levels across the scenarios 
(more on this is discussed in Section 6.2.2.1). Several performance metrics were collected 
during each scenario for each participant. The metrics included route selected for 
evacuation, time to muster, time spent running, interaction with fire doors and watertight 
doors, interaction with hazards, and reporting to the muster station. Data collected in 
different scenarios were divided into two sets. Data collected in some scenarios (for all 
participants) were used to develop the HBM. Data collected in the remaining scenarios (for 
all participants) were used to validate the HBM. 
 
Section 6.2.2 discusses the dynamic response generation for a given situation. The 
probabilistic aspects of the HBM are described in this section. Section 6.2.3 describes how 
knowledge gained from training and experience form the current state of knowledge. It also 





6.2.2 Dynamic response model 
The dynamic response model has been documented in detail in the authors’ previous work 
(Musharraf et al., 2017). This section presents a brief overview of the model to facilitate 
the understanding of the validation process, which is the focus of this paper. 
 
The dynamic response model consists of four component models: an environment model, 
an operator model, a performance shaping model, and a task network model. The 
environmental model defines the situation, or environment, using external PIFs.  The 
operator model defines the characteristics of the operator using internal PIFs. The task 
network model graphically represents the sequence of tasks performed by the operator. The 
performance shaping model generates the rules of behavior of the operators depending on 
the state of different PIFs and the current state of knowledge. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the interaction between the external world and the component models. At 
any time ‘t’ the state of PIFs in the environmental model and operator model are defined 
based on the events happening in the external world. The state of the internal and external 
factors defines the operator’s state of mind. The PIFs also define how information is gained 
from training and experience. The performance shaping function (PSF) model takes the 
operator’s state of mind and current state of knowledge into account, and generates the 




The following subsections introduce the four component models. The process of 
knowledge acquisition and retrieval is modeled based on the idea of knowledge based 
system architecture (Negnevitsky, 2005). This is discussed separately in Section 6.2.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Interaction between the external world and the four component models: operator model, 
environmental model, performance shaping function model, and task networking model (after 




6.2.2.1 Environmental model 
The environmental model includes external PIFs that define the situation or environment 
the individual is in. The external PIFs that were used in the experiment are training, 
visibility, and complexity. 
 
As noted previously, each participant was assigned to either G1 or G2 for training.  During 
the study, G1 received more advanced training compared to G2. 
 
In the simulated scenarios, visibility was varied at two different levels: clearly visible and 
blackout. In clearly visible conditions, there was enough ambient light to perform the 
assigned task. In the blackout conditions, the visibility was reduced by reducing the 
available ambient light. However, the participants could use a virtual flashlight in the 
blackout conditions to have functional visibility. 
 
Complexity was also varied at two different levels: low and high. In low complexity 
conditions, there was no obstacle in the preferred evacuation route, and the responsibility 
assigned to the participant was minimal. High complexity situations were created by 
blocking the escape routes with hazards (i.e. smoke, fire, and explosion), and assigning 
more responsibilities to the participants. Complexity of the situation was also reflected in 
the alarm (static versus dynamic) and PA (direct versus indirect). To summarize, alarm, 
PA, presence of hazard, obstruction of routes, and amount of responsibility assigned to the 




6.2.2.2 Operator model 
Operator model focuses on the internal PIFs (Groth & Mosleh, 2012). It was observed 
during the study that given the same environmental conditions, participants’ response to an 
emergency may vary depending on the internal PIFs. The internal PIFs investigated in the 
experiment were knowledge, bias, information use, compliance, and prioritization.  
 
It was observed in the experimental data that given the same training, people focus on 
different scenario attributes before making a decision. This resulted in different knowledge-
matrices and hence different problem-solving strategies across participants (Musharraf et 
al., 2017a).  
 
During the study, while some participants were biased (inclined to previous experience), 
some were not. Some participants effectively used the information presented to them, while 
some failed to do so. Some participants prioritized personal safety over notifying others 
about the hazard. Some participants were safety compliant and followed the regulations; 
others failed to follow the safety regulations under the pressure of emergency. 
6.2.2.3 Task networking model  
Task network modeling focuses on understanding the tasks that need to be simulated. The 
task network model graphically represents the sequence of tasks performed by an operator. 
  
Figure 6.3 shows the task network of general personnel during offshore emergency egress. 




in the figure using dashed lines. Additional to the decision points, errors can also occur 
during the following: identifying the alarm and interpreting the PA, re-assessing the 
situation (i.e. interpreting updated alarm and PA, checking proximity to hazard), moving 













Figure 6.3: Sequence of tasks performed by general personnel during offshore emergency egress. Solid lines represent standard sequence, 




6.2.2.4 Performance shaping model 
This model includes a set of performance shaping functions (PSFs). The PSFs generate the 
rules of behavior that govern the performance of general personnel while performing 
different tasks (Chang & Mosleh, 2007). The response of general personnel depends on the 
state of the operator and the current state of knowledge. The PSFs take the state of the 
operator and current state of knowledge into account and generate the associated operator 
response for a given set of PIFs. 
 
For example, during the training, the participants were trained to identify different alarms. 
Based on the training, the following alarm identification rule will be stored in the memory: 
a two-tone sound is a General platform alarm (GPA); a constant tone sound is a Prepare to 
abandon platform alarm (PAPA). During an emergency scenario, based on the state of the 
PIFs, a participant may retrieve and use the alarm identification rule correctly, or can make 
a mistake and misinterpret the alarm. The PSFs compute the probability of making such an 
error. They take the PIFs as inputs and use a Bayesian network (BN) approach to compute 
the human error probability. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the relationship between human error and PIFs. Here, error is modeled as 
the outcome of joint influence of PIFs. More detail on the BN development and probability 






Figure 6.4: Human error(𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝑬𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓𝒎 ) while performing a task is the outcome of joint 
influence of performance influencing factors (𝑷𝑰𝑭𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝑷𝑰𝑭𝒏). 
 
6.2.3 Memory structure and cognitive functions 
In the HBM, the knowledge-matrices and problem-solving strategies are stored in a 
database representative of human memory. This data base is referred to as the memory 
structure. Organization of information in the memory structure is modeled based on the 
idea of knowledge based system architecture (Kendal & Creen, 2007). The underlying 
assumption is that people’s response to emergency situations depends in part on the 
knowledge they have stored in their memory. The three main components of the memory 
structure are: knowledge base, working memory, and inference engine. The working 
memory has a finite capacity and stores the information relevant to the problem that is 
currently being solved. The knowledge base has a theoretically infinite capacity and stores 
all the knowledge gained through training and experience. The inference engine is an 
intermediate memory space that contains generalized decision rules based on the content 




The process involved in creating generalizations from observed phenomena or principles 
is referred to as induction. Among the available induction approaches, decision tree is used 
in the development of the HBM. In decision tree induction, data are divided into certain 
groups based on the information gain of the attributes, with the goal that the examples in 
any particular group will belong to the same class (Han et al., 2011). Decision tree offers a 
visual representation of the reasoning process and has valuable diagnostic capabilities. 
Compared to other methods, such as artificial neural networks or support vector machines, 
decision trees can be constructed relatively quickly. Other benefits of decision tree, which 
are particularly important for this paper, are that it does not require any prior assumptions 
about the data and can work with limited data compared to other techniques (Duffy, 2008). 
More on decision tree induction can be found in Musharraf et al. (2017a).  
 
During information processing to solve the problem at hand, cues are perceived from the 
environment. The perceived cues are interpreted to form a calling condition. A calling 
condition is a set of variables that takes values from a defined set (Thow-Yick, 1994). If a 
solution to the current calling condition is available in the working memory, it is 
immediately retrieved. Otherwise the calling condition is transferred to the inference engine 
to find a solution. If a decision rule that matches the current calling condition is found, the 
solution is retrieved and sent to working memory to act upon. If no matching decision rule 
is found, the calling condition is sent to the knowledge base. More abstract relationships 




analyzed at this stage. Once a solution is found, the next step is to execute a series of actions 
to implement it. 
 
6.3 Validation process for the HBM  
As listed in DMSO's "Validation of Human behavior representation", any HBM validation 
process needs to perform the following high-level tasks: 
1. Collect as complete a set of requirements and acceptability criteria as possible.  
2. Identify referent(s) to assess the credibility of the HBM model. 
3. Validate the HBM’s conceptual model using referent and requirements. 
4. Validate the HBM’s knowledge base using referent and requirements. 
5. Analyze the HBM’s conceptual model and knowledge base to identify complex 
areas of the model that need attention in future validation activities. 
6. Validate the integrated HBM using referent and requirements. This is called result 
validation and involves acceptability criteria testing by exercising testing scenarios 
to ensure that the integrated HBM performs adequately under different operating 
conditions. Before the result validation, the HBM must be integrated in the virtual 
environment. In this paper, the model is integrated in AVERT to create software 
agents performing as general personnel. The complex areas identified in the 
previous step are used at the result validation step to design credible test scenarios. 
 




6.3.1 Collect as complete a set of requirements and acceptability criteria as possible 
The first step of validating the HBM was to make a list of requirements that will set the 
foundation of validation. Since listing a complete set of requirements was challenging in 
an early stage, attention was paid to fulfill the minimum requirements first. The minimum 
requirements include a detailed task analysis of the person the HBM is intended to represent 
and the definition of level of skills that the simulation must include. A list of PIFs were 
defined as well.  Fidelity of the simulated behavior largely depends on how well the effect 
of these PIFs are modeled. 
 
Detailed task analysis of general personnel represented by the HBM: A detailed task 
analysis of general personnel during offshore emergency situations was done based on 
(DiMattia, Khan, & Amyotte, 2005). The corresponding activity diagram and possible 
deviations from ideal behavior are presented in Section 6.2.2.3. For an agent to be 
acceptable, it must be able to perform all the tasks outlined in Figure 6.3. Like humans, 
agents can also make mistakes while performing a task. 
 
The AVERT configuration during the experimental study did not allow performing the 
following tasks – returning process equipment to safe state, making workplace as safe as 
possible, and collecting personal survival suit. Though some of these functionalities are in 
the current configuration and hence integrated in the agents, they will not be discussed 





Level of skills of general personnel:  The HBM was developed to represent three different 
levels of skill: ideal personnel, naïve personnel, and in-between personnel. The levels of 
skill were defined in terms of internal PIFs. The internal PIFs and corresponding states are 
listed in Table 6.1. Details of the internal PIFs were discussed in Section 6.2.2.2.  Different 
levels of skill were achieved by varying the state of the internal PIFs. 
 
Table 6.1: Internal PIFs and corresponding possible states 
Internal PIFs Possible states 
Bias Yes, No 
Compliance High, Low 
Efficacy of information use High, Low 
Knowledge High, Low 
Prioritization Right, Wrong 
Preference of route Primary route, Secondary route 
 
 
Ideal agents were created by setting the internal PIFs in the following way: knowledge as 
high, bias as low, compliance as high, efficacy of information use as high, and prioritization 
as right. To create naïve agents, internal PIFs were set in the exact opposite way: knowledge 
as low, bias as high, compliance as low, efficacy of information use as low, and 
prioritization as wrong. In-between agents are representative of the behavior range between 
the two extremes of ideal and naïve. These agents can be created by using different 
combinations of the internal PIF values. The example in-between agents used in this paper 
were created by setting knowledge as low, bias as low, compliance as high, prioritization 




PIFs or behavior moderators: Two kinds of PIFs – internal and external - are used in this 
paper. Internal PIFs were presented in Table 6.1. Besides internal PIFs, a list of external 
PIFs are used to delimit the range of situations in which the HBM is expected to perform. 
Table 6.2 provides a list of external factors and the corresponding possible states. Details 
of the external factors were discussed in Section 6.2.2.1. 
Table 6.2: External PIFs and corresponding possible states 
External PIFs Possible states 
Alarm (Audio & visual 
cues) 
GPA, PAPA 
Route direction in PA None, Primary route, Secondary route 
Obstruction of routes None, Primary route, Secondary route 
Presence of hazard Yes, No 
Visibility High, Low 
 
6.3.2 Identify referent(s) to assess the credibility of the HBM  
Referent refers to a codified body of knowledge about a thing being simulated. During 
validation, referent provides the information with which the simulation outcomes are 
compared. Among the six different model correspondences listed in the “Key concepts of 
VV&A”, domain correspondence is used in this paper (RPG: Reference Document - Key 
Concepts of VV&A, 2001). Two domain referents were used at different steps of the HBM 
validation. At the earlier stage, inputs from SMEs were used to validate the conceptual 
model. As the validation progressed, empirical evidence collected during the experimental 





6.3.3 Validate the HBM’s conceptual model using referent and requirements 
The conceptual model of the HBM of general personnel consists of the followings: 
1. Tasks the HBM must perform: As discussed in Section 6.3.1, a detailed task 
analysis for the general personnel was performed. The analysis resulted in a list of 
tasks that the HBM must perform during offshore emergency situations. The tasks 
are presented in Figure 6.3. 
2. Objects and properties of those objects that the HBM can sense: All the external 
PIFs listed in Table 6.2 fall in this category. 
3. Objects and properties of those objects that the HBM can explicitly change through 
its actions: During a simulated scenario in AVERT, the agent may interact with and 
change the properties of the following objects: Doors, Muster board, T-Card, 
Personal protective equipment (PPE), and Manual alarm call point (MAC).  
4. Effects of the internal factors that can moderate the model’s response: The internal 
PIFs that can moderate the model’s response are listed in Table 6.1. These PIFs 
were used to capture the across subject variability during the same scenario. The 
PSFs discussed in Section 6.2.2.4 were used to model the effects of the internal PIFs 
on response. The PSFs take the internal PIFs as inputs and use a BN to generate a 
dynamic response. 
5. Knowledge that the HBM must possess to manifest the proper responses to the 
proper situations: The rules of behavior integrated in the HBM were generated from 
the same training tutorials and training scenarios used to train the participants in the 




help with platform familiarity, interpretation of the audio-visual cues from the alarm 
and PA, and safety procedures like closing fire/watertight doors and not running. 
The training scenarios were used to generate behavior rules that help the agent in 
choosing the egress route (including possible re-route depending on the situation) 
during an emergency scenario. It must be noted that given the same training, 
participants were observed to learn and infer things differently. Consequently, the 
content of the knowledge base varied from person to person. The same concept was 
followed while developing the knowledge base of the agents. The contents of the 
knowledge base in naïve, ideal, and in-between agents were different, allowing 
behavior variability. 
 
Once the conceptual model was developed, it was checked with the SMEs to make sure of 
the following: 
 
Sets of situations and responses are sufficient to accommodate the scenarios required to 
achieve the purpose: In the experimental study, sets of situations were chosen based on 
SME guidance and industry standards. The same set of situations were used for training 
and testing the agents. The external PIFs listed in Table 6.2 were used to create the range 
of credible situations. This list was reviewed by the SMEs. Though not comprehensive, the 





The possible range of responses – both ideal and erroneous – were also reviewed by the 
SMEs. The responses captured by the task network in Figure 6.3 were considered sufficient 
and no further revision was suggested. However, the SMEs suggested the following 
additions to the potential error list:  
• Not securing workspace before mustering 
• Forgetting to register at the final destination – not doing the T-Card 
• Not providing relevant feedback at the final destination 
• Premature evacuation – getting in the lifeboat and driving away 
 
As the current configuration of AVERT could not allow for the suggested additions, these 
additions are considered as future work and are out of scope of this paper. 
 
Influences of internal PIFs or behavior moderators are adequately represented: The list of 
internal PIFs in Table 6.1 was reviewed by the SMEs. The list was considered sufficient to 
model the across subject variability. A BN approach was used to model the influence of the 
PIFs on performance (Musharraf et al., 2016a). The influence of internal PIFs on task 
performance cannot be studied in a controlled experiment. Goerger (2004) identifes this as 
the most complex phase of creating and modifying BN for HBM development. In this 
paper, the influence of internal PIFs is defined by the analyst based on the observations 
during the experimental study. Musharraf et al. (2016a) shows a successful demonstration 




6.3.4 Validate the HBM’s knowledge base using referent and requirements 
As stated in Section 6.3.3, the rules of behavior were generated from the same training 
content used to train the participants in the experimental study. Decision rules with causal 
if/then association were generated from the observation of participants’ performance during 
the training scenarios. Participants’ performance in test scenarios was then predicted using 
the generated decision rules. The predicted performance was compared to the observed 
performance of the participants in the same scenarios, using data that had been set aside for 
validation. The prediction accuracy of the trees can be calculated using equation 1.  
 
(%)𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑛
𝑁
 × 100                                           (1) 
 
where 𝑛 = number of test scenarios for which (predicted outcome = observed outcome) 
and 𝑁 =  total number of test scenarios. 
 
An average of 95% prediction accuracy was achieved for the decision rules in the 
knowledge base. For 85% of participants, the prediction was accurate for all test scenarios 
(i.e. 100% accuracy). More detail on this can be found in Musharraf et al. (2017a). 
6.3.5 Analyze the HBM’s conceptual model and knowledge base to identify complex 
areas of the model that need attention in future validation activities 
The conceptual model helps to define number, ranges, and intersections of the inputs 




intersections of different situations to which the HBM must be able to respond. All this 
information contributes to identifying the complex areas of the HBM. The knowledge base 
validation also contributes by recognizing where the complexities of the knowledge lie. 
 
A few complex areas in the behavior space were identified during conceptual model and 
knowledge base validation. These include coping with alarm changes and PA changes 
during an emergency situation, understanding route obstruction from the PA and using this 
knowledge while evaluating different egress routes, re-routing to avoid potential interaction 
with hazard, and understanding the responsibility to raise the alarm when the first observer 
of any hazard. Identification of the complex areas guided the test scenario design in the 
next step. 
6.3.6 Result validation 
Result validation consists of two steps. The first step is to perform a fundamental testing to 
see if the agent can demonstrate adequate individual skills. In the context of this paper, this 
means the agent must be able to perform the tasks of a general personnel during different 
offshore emergency situations. Since the focus of this step is to make sure that competent 
performance of a general personnel can be achieved by the agent, among the three types of 
the agents (i.e. naïve, ideal, and in-between) only performance of ideal agents will be 
analyzed at this step. The next step is to test that the HBM is able to capture the expected 
range of behaviors under different operating conditions. Besides ideal agents, performance 
of naïve and in-between agents will also be analyzed at this step. At both steps, test results 




Result validation involves 4 critical steps. Steps of result validation are described in detail 
in the following subsections. 
6.3.6.1 Developing the HBM test plan 
The fundamental steps of developing the test plan were to define the objectives and the type 
of testing that will be done. The objective of the test was to see if the HBM performs 
adequately under different operating conditions. Only aspects of agents related to the HBM 
were investigated. General aspects, such as look and feel of the agents, were out of the 
scope of the result validation. Among different testing approaches, acceptability criteria 
testing was selected as suggested by Anon. (2001a). 
 
Acceptance criteria define the desirable behavior outcomes of the HBM. Defining 
acceptability criteria for an HBM is challenging due to its stochastic nature. Even for the 
same operating conditions and the same set of PIFs, there can be more than one acceptable 
behavior outcome. The behaviors observed during the experimental study were used as a 
benchmark to define an acceptable range. In the original study, participants’ performance 
was tested in a set of testing scenarios. Each participant achieved an aggregated 
performance score at the end of the test scenario (Smith , 2015). The score of a participant 
can be used to classify them into one of the following categories: naïve (0-30%), in-between 
(31-79%), and ideal (80-100%). Behaviors observed in each category were used to define 





The observed behavior of participants across emergency scenarios are listed in Table 6.3. 
As shown in Table 6.3, there are expected ideal behavior outcomes for each task. However, 
erroneous deviations were also observed during scenarios. All these define the acceptable 
behavior range for the HBM.  
 
Behavior of ideal agents is expected to incline towards the ideal behavior outcomes 
observed during the experimental study. Naïve agents are expected to incline more towards 
the erroneous deviations. In-between agents are expected to have a combination of ideal 
and erroneous behavior outcomes. Figure 6.5 summarizes the HBM test plan. 
 
It should be noted that all tasks shown in Figure 6.3 are not listed in Table 6.3 as tasks such 














Table 6.3: List of observed behavior outcomes during offshore emergency scenarios 
Task Demonstrated 
by 




Identify Alarm Mustering at 
the correct final 
destination 
Muster at the muster 
station in case of GPA 
and the starboard side 
lifeboat station in case 
of PAPA 
Misidentify GPA as 
PAPA or vice versa and 
muster at the incorrect 
location. 
Evaluate 
egress path and 
choose egress 
route 
Moving along a 
chosen egress 
route 
Choose an egress route 
according to the 
direction of the PA. No 
interaction with hazard 
and/or rerouting 
expected if the correct 
route is chosen. 
Choose an incorrect route 
and - 
reroute as soon as hazard 
is observed 
keep following the 
untenable route 






Same as the task – 
identify alarm 
Same as the task – identify 
alarm. 
Additionally, muster at 
the port side lifeboat 
station instead of 
starboard side lifeboat 













Walking and keeping 
all fire/watertight doors 
closed 
Running and keeping 
fire/watertight doors open 
Raising an 
alarm in case 
of first 






Activating MAC if 
there is a hazard on 
sight and no alarm or 
PA is currently 
activated. 
 








Figure 6.5: Fundamental steps in the HBM test plan. During the test, behavior of all three types of agents is compared to the acceptability criteria 




6.3.6.2 Designing the HBM testing scenarios 
Design of test scenarios to validate the HBM was guided by the complex areas identified 
during conceptual model and knowledge base validation. First, a basic static scenario was 
designed. This scenario covered the fundamental task that the agent must be able to 
perform. Next, complexities were added by following means: dynamic changes of alarm 
and PA, obstruction of primary route with hazard, obstruction of secondary route with 
hazard, and introduction of a hazard on sight without any alarm or PA. 
 
Table 6.4 summarizes the test scenarios for the HBM validation exercise. 




Scn1 Agent starts in the cabin. A GPA sounds followed by a PA announcement 
notifying of a man overboard (MOB) drill. The agent must go to muster 
station using either primary or secondary egress route. 
Scn2 Agent starts in the cabin. Fire erupts in the galley signaling a GPA. The agent 
must go to the muster station, but re-route to the lifeboat station due to the 
fire and smoke spreading to the adjacent muster station. The primary egress 
route and the muster station are compromised by the hazards. 
Scn3 Agent starts in the cabin. A fire and explosion on the helideck signal a GPA. 
High winds cause the smoke to engulf a portion of the platform exterior. The 
agent must go to the muster station, but re-route to the lifeboat station due to 
the increase in emergency severity and the alarm change to PAPA. The 
hazard blocks the secondary egress route. 
Scn4 Agent starts in the C-Deck Hallway and watches smoke coming out the cabin. 
The alarm is not triggered and no PA is available. Agent must raise the alarm 




6.3.6.3 Conducting the tests and assessing test results against the acceptability criteria 
The three types of agents were tested in the 4 scenarios listed in Table 6.4. As observed in 
the experimental study, agents were allowed to have a preferred egress route. With 3 types 
of agents, 2 possible preferred routes, and 4 different scenarios, a total of 24 combinations 
had to be tested. Figure 6.6 shows the possible combinations. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Possible combinations for testing and data collection 
10 simulation runs were conducted for each combination, giving a total of 240 simulation 
runs. As the HBM is stochastic, even for the same combination, behavior may vary across 
repeated simulation conditions. The most common behaviors observed for each 
combination are discussed below. 
 
Naïve agents: As stated in Section 6.3.1, naïve agents were created by setting knowledge 
as low, bias as high, compliance as low, efficacy of information use as low, and 
prioritization as wrong. Table 6.5 lists the most common behaviors of naïve agents 




Table 6.5: Common behaviors of naïve agents in the testing scenarios 
Scenario 
Observed behavior 
Preference: Primary route Preference: Secondary route 
Scn1 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the primary 
route to egress and goes to the mess 
hall. While egressing, the agent 
keeps the fire/watertight doors 
open and runs instead of walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the secondary 
route to egress and goes to the mess 
hall through starboard side. While 
egressing, the agent keeps the 
fire/watertight doors open and runs 
instead of walks. 
Scn2 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the primary 
egress route and heads toward the 
mess hall. As the agent arrives at 
the mess hall, it finds the muster 
station compromised. The agent 
interacts with the hazard. As the 
alarm changes to PAPA, the agent 
decides to reroute to the lifeboat 
station. The agent mistakenly goes 
to the port side lifeboat instead of 
the starboard side lifeboat. While 
egressing, the agent keeps the 
fire/watertight doors open and runs 
instead of walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the secondary 
egress route and heads toward the mess 
hall. On the way to the mess hall, the 
alarm changes to PAPA. The agent 
reroutes to the lifeboat station. The 
agent mistakenly goes to the port side 
lifeboat instead of the starboard side 
lifeboat. While egressing, the agent 
keeps the fire/watertight doors open 
and runs instead of walks. 
Scn3 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the primary 
egress route and heads toward the 
mess hall. As the alarm changes to 
PAPA, the agent decides to reroute 
to the lifeboat station. The agent 
mistakenly goes to the port side 
lifeboat instead of the starboard 
side lifeboat. While egressing, the 
agent keeps the fire/watertight 
doors open and runs instead of 
walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the secondary 
egress route and heads toward the mess 
hall. On the way, the agent sees the 
smoke, but goes through it anyway. As 
the alarm changes, the agent reroutes to 
the lifeboat station. The agent 
mistakenly goes to the port side 
lifeboat instead of the starboard side 
lifeboat. While egressing, the agent 
keeps the fire/watertight doors open 






Preference: Primary route Preference: Secondary route 
Scn4 
Agent starts in the C-Deck 
Hallway (farthest from the cabin). 
The agent considers the danger 
imminent and starts to egress 
without activating the MAC. Agent 
takes the primary egress route to 
the mess hall and musters there. 
While egressing, the agent keeps 
the fire/watertight doors open and 
runs instead of walks. 
Agent starts in the C-Deck Hallway 
(farthest from the cabin). The agent 
considers the danger imminent and 
starts to egress without activating the 
MAC. Agent takes the primary egress 
route to the mess hall and musters 
there. While egressing, the agent keeps 
the fire/watertight doors open and runs 
instead of walks. 
 
As shown in Table 6.5, the naïve agents followed their preferred route irrespective of the 
obstruction of the route with hazard.  This led to interaction with the hazard. The other 
common mistakes were: confusing the portside lifeboat station as the starboard side lifeboat 
station, running, keeping fire/watertight doors open, and not activating the MAC as the first 
observer of the hazard. By comparing the performance of the naïve agents against the 
acceptability criteria listed in Table 6.3, it is found that in most cases the performance 
matches the erroneous behavior outcomes, as expected. 
 
Ideal agents: Ideal agents were created by setting the internal PIFs in the following way: 
knowledge as high, bias as low, compliance as high, efficacy of information use as high, 
and prioritization as right. Table 6.6 lists the most common behaviors of ideal agents 






Table 6.6: Common behaviors of ideal agents in the testing scenarios 
Scenario 
Observed behavior 
Preference: Primary route Preference: Secondary route 
Scn1 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the 
primary route to egress and goes 
to the mess hall. While egressing, 
the agent closes all fire/watertight 
doors and walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, the agent takes the secondary 
route to egress and goes to the mess hall 
through the starboard side. While 
egressing, the agent closes all 
fire/watertight doors and walks. 
Scn2 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, it waits and listens to the 
PA. Based on the PA, it takes the 
secondary route and heads toward 
the mess hall. As the alarm 
changes to PAPA, it goes to the 
lifeboat station instead, and 
musters there. While egressing, 
the agent closes all fire/watertight 
doors and walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, it waits and listens to the PA. 
Based on the PA, it takes the secondary 
route and heads toward the mess hall. As 
the alarm changes to PAPA, it goes to 
the lifeboat station instead, and musters 
there. While egressing, the agent closes 
all fire/watertight doors and walks. 
Scn3 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, it waits and listens to the 
PA. Based on the PA, it takes the 
primary route and heads toward 
mess hall. As alarm changes to 
PAPA, it goes to the lifeboat 
station through the mess hall and 
musters there. While egressing, 
the agent closes all fire/watertight 
doors and walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA 
sounds, it waits and listens to the PA. 
Based on the PA, it takes the primary 
route and heads toward the mess hall. As 
alarm changes to PAPA, it goes to the 
lifeboat station and musters there. While 
egressing, the agent closes all 
fire/watertight doors and walks. 
Scn4 
Agent starts in the C-Deck 
Hallway (farthest from the cabin). 
As a first observer of the hazard, 
the agent activates the MAC. It 
takes the primary egress route to 
the mess hall and musters there. 
While egressing, the agent closes 
all fire/watertight doors and 
walks. 
a. Agent starts in the C-Deck Hallway 
(farthest from the cabin). As a first 
observer of the hazard, the agent 
activates the MAC. It takes the 
primary egress route to the mess hall 
and musters there. While egressing, 
the agent closes all fire/watertight 






b. Agent starts in the C-Deck Hallway 
(farthest from the cabin). As a first 
observer of the hazard, the agent 
activates the MAC. It approaches 
the secondary stairwell from a 
different way than usual to avoid the 
hazard. The agent takes the 
secondary route to the mess hall and 
musters there. While egressing, the 
agent closes all fire/watertight doors 
and walks. 
 
The ideal agents were able to perform all the tasks of general personnel during emergency 
situations. Though the probability of the ideal agents making a mistake is non-zero, their 
most common behaviors match the ideal behaviors as defined in Table 6.3. Irrespective of 
their preferred route, ideal agents were able to pick a route to avoid potential interaction 
with hazards. They registered at the correct muster location and followed the safety 
procedures while egressing. They were also able to activate the MAC as the first observer 
of the hazard. The occasional errors made by the ideal agents were running and not closing 
the fire/watertight doors. These were also the most common erroneous behaviors of the 
participants with high scores in the experimental study. 
 
It is also worth noting that unlike naïve agents, the ideal agents did not always prefer one 
route over another. The preference often depended on the final destination or presence of 
hazards. For example, an ideal agent may prefer the primary route when there is no hazard, 





In-between agents: As discussed in Section 6.3.1, the example in-between agents used in 
this paper were created by setting knowledge as low, bias as low, compliance as high, 
prioritization as right, and efficacy of information use as low. Table 6.7 lists the most 
common behaviors of in-between agents observed in the testing scenarios. 
Table 6.7: Common behaviors of in-between agents in the testing scenarios 
Scenario 
Observed behavior 
Preference: Primary route Preference: Secondary route 
Scn1 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA sounds, 
the agent takes the primary route to egress 
and goes to the mess hall. While egressing, 
the agent keeps all fire/watertight doors 
open but walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As 
GPA sounds, the agent takes 
the secondary route to egress 
and goes to the mess hall 
through starboard side. While 
egressing, the agent keeps all 
fire/watertight doors open and 
runs instead of walks. 
Scn2 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA sounds, 
the agent takes the primary route to mess 
hall. As it reaches the mess hall, it realizes 
that the mess hall is compromised. The 
agent immediately reroutes. It goes up a 
deck and takes the secondary route to 
egress. In the meantime, alarm changes to 
PAPA and the agent musters at the lifeboat 
station. While egressing, the agent keeps 
all fire/watertight doors open but walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As 
GPA sounds, the agent takes 
the secondary route and heads 
towards mess hall. As the alarm 
changes to PAPA on the way, 
the agent musters at the lifeboat 
station instead. While 
egressing, the agent closes all 
fire/watertight doors and walks. 
Scn3 
Agent starts in the cabin. As GPA sounds, 
it waits and listens to the PA. Based on the 
PA, it takes the primary route and heads 
towards mess hall. As alarm changes to 
PAPA, it goes to the lifeboat station 
through mess hall and musters there. 
While egressing, the agent keeps all 
fire/watertight doors open and runs instead 
of walks. 
Agent starts in the cabin. As 
GPA sounds, the agent takes 
the secondary route to egress. It 
reroutes immediately after 
finding out that the route is 
compromised with smoke. It 
takes the primary route and 
goes to starboard side lifeboat 
through mess hall. While 
egressing, the agent closes all 




Scenario Preference: Primary route Preference: Secondary route 
Scn4 
Agent starts in the C-Deck Hallway 
(farthest from the cabin). The agent 
considers the danger imminent and start to 
egress without activating the MAC. Agent 
takes primary egress route to mess hall and 
musters there. While egressing, the agent 
closes all fire/watertight doors and walks. 
Agent starts in the C-Deck 
Hallway (farthest from the 
cabin). The agent considers the 
danger imminent and starts to 
egress without activating the 
MAC. It approaches the 
secondary stairwell from a 
different way than the usual to 
avoid the hazard. The agent 
takes the secondary route to 
mess hall and musters there. 
While egressing, the agent 
closes all fire/watertight doors 
but runs instead of walks. 
 
As shown in Table 6.7, behaviors of in-between agents lie somewhere between the two 
extremes of ideal and naïve agents. The in-between agents may fail to interpret the PA and 
take the ideal route from the beginning. As soon as they realize that the current route is 
untenable, they reroute immediately. The agents may not follow the safety procedure at all 
times, and may forget to activate the MAC. As expected, in all scenarios, the in-between 
agents had a combination of ideal and erroneous behavior outcomes. 
 
A summary of agent behavior in Scn2 is presented in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. Figure 6.7 shows 
the number of erroneous behaviors observed for each type of agent during the 10 simulation 
runs for this scenario. As show in the figure, though ideal agents occasionally commit 
errors, in general they exhibit safer behavior compared to the in-between and naïve agents. 
In all simulation runs, the ideal and in-between agents manage to avoid interaction with 




after encountering the hazard. Figure 6.8 summarizes the route choice of all types of agents 
in Scn2. Behavior of agents in other scenarios can be summarized in the same way.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Observed erroneous behavior of 3 types of agents in Scn2 (preference = primary route) 
for 10 simulation runs each. 
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6.4 Limitations and future work 
One of the biggest challenges faced during result validation was to determine the number 
of simulation runs. With a deterministic simulation, just one run is enough. The answer is 
not so simple for stochastic simulations. Though some guidelines are available for 
determining the number of runs for quantitative stochastic simulations, such guidelines are 
not available for qualitative simulations like behavior simulation (Byrne, 2013). In this 
paper, a total of 240 runs were conducted simply for feasibility. However, that only allowed 
10 runs for each combination. In future, more runs per combination will be conducted to 
increase the confidence in the results (Ritter et al., 2011). 
 
The testing conducted during result validation did not involve SMEs. It is often 
recommended in literature to involve SMEs in the testing process by either direct 
participation or by review of the testing report. Authors plan to get the test reports reviewed 
by SMEs in future. Authors also plan to extend the behavior spectrum by including worksite 
scenarios and having more than one agent simultaneously. 
 
It must be noted that virtual environments can provide a certain degree of realism and 
should not be expected to be an exact counterpart to real life emergency situations. The 
goal of the validation presented in this paper is to make sure that the agents behave as 
realistically as the participants in the study. More sophisticated behavior of the agents (i.e. 





With the advancement of simulators as a training tool, use of software agents to enable 
team training has become quite common. Credibility of these agents is critical to ensure a 
sound training process. Validation of the underlying HBM of these agents is the first step 
to ensure such credibility. This paper presents the validation process of an HBM of general 
personnel, created for an offshore emergency training simulator. Unlike traditional HBM 
validation processes that use experts’ opinion, empirical evidence was used in this paper. 
Use of empirical evidence makes the validation more objective and reliable.  
 
All high-level tasks of validation are discussed in detail with special emphasis given on the 
acceptability criteria testing. Three types of agents – naïve, ideal, and in-between – were 
tested during validation. Results show that the integrated HBM meets the acceptability 
criteria requirement for all types of agents. This indicates that the agents have potential to 
be used as team members for crew training in offshore emergency situations. A 
combination of different types of agents will allow creating a heterogeneous training 
environment, which would be a closer representation of the actual working environment. 
 
Future work includes improving the result validation by conducting more simulation runs 
and getting the test reports reviewed by SMEs. The authors also plan to extend the behavior 
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This data article describes the experimental data used in the research article “Incorporating 
individual differences in human reliability analysis: an extension to the virtual experimental 
technique” (Musharraf et al., in press). The article provides human performance data for 36 
individuals collected using a virtual environment. Each participant was assigned to one of 
two groups for training: 1) G1: high level training and 2) G2: low level training. 
Participants’ performance was tested in 4 different virtual scenarios with different levels of 
visibility and complexity. Several performance metrics of the participants were recorded 
during each scenario. The metrics include: time to muster, time spent running, interaction 
with fire doors and watertight doors, interaction with hazards, and reporting at different 
muster locations 
Specifications Table  
Subject area Engineering, Human factors 
More specific subject area Safety & Risk, Human Reliability Analysis 
Type of data Text files 
How data was acquired Data were collected by conducting an experiment in a 
virtual environment. The virtual environment used is 
called the all-hands virtual emergency response trainer 
(AVERT) and was developed at the Memorial University. 
AVERT was designed to enhance offshore emergency 
response training. The virtual environment is modeled 
after an offshore oil installation platform with high levels 
of detail. It is capable of creating credible emergency 
scenarios by introducing hazards such as blackouts, fires 
and explosions. 
Human performance data of 36 individuals tested in 
simulated emergency scenarios in AVERT were collected. 




Experimental factors The participants were naïve concerning any detail of the 
experimental design, they were not employed in the 
offshore oil and gas industry, and were not familiar with 
the AVERT simulator prior to the experiment. Their ages 
ranged from 19-39 years. Information regarding 
participants’ gaming and marine experience was collected 
prior to the experiment. This information guided the 
assignment of participants into different training groups. 
Participants were provided with basic offshore emergency 
preparedness training tutorials before performing in any 
simulated emergency scenarios. 
Experimental features Two performance influencing factors (PIFs) – visibility 
and complexity – were each tested at two different levels 
to create 22 = 4 virtual testing scenarios. Participants’ 
performance was tested in the scenarios and the following 
performance metrics were collected: time to muster, time 
spent running, interaction with fire doors and watertight 
doors, interaction with hazards, and reporting at different 
muster locations (i.e. mess hall/muster station, lifeboat 
starboard side, lifeboat port side). 
Data source location Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, NL, 
Canada 
Data accessibility The data are with this article. 
 
Value of the data  
• The data serve as a benchmark for human performance in emergency situations. 
• The data allow objective assessment of human reliability rather than subjective 
assessments that rely on expert judgement. 
• The data enable investigating the effects of different PIFs on human performance. 
• The data provide the information that each human is different and the effect of PIFs on 
performance can vary from individual to individual. 





Human performance data for 36 individuals in 4 testing scenarios are associated with this 
article. The testing scenarios were created in AVERT. Two PIFs – visibility and complexity 
– were varied in the scenarios. Details of the 4 testing scenarios can be found in Table 3 in 
(Musharraf et al., in press). 
 
Performance metrics recorded during the scenarios include: time to muster, time spent 
running, interaction with fire doors and watertight doors, interaction with hazards, and 
reporting at different muster locations. 
 
The 4 supplementary text files summarize the performance metrics of 36 individuals in the 
4 simulated emergency scenarios. 
7.2 Experimental Design, Materials and Methods 
The data presented in this article were originally collected during an experimental study 
presented in (Smith J. , 2015) and (Musharraf et al., 2016). Though a broad range of human 
performance data were collected during the study, this article only presents the data relevant 
to the article “Incorporating individual differences in human reliability analysis: an 
extension to the virtual experimental technique” (Musharraf et al., in press). 
 
A total of 36 participants took part in the study with a goal to learn how to perform a 
successful offshore emergency evacuation. The participants were naïve concerning any 




industry, and therefore they were not familiar with the offshore platform. Each participant 
was assigned to one of two groups for training: 1) G1: high level training and 2) G2: low 
level training. Participants in both groups received basic offshore emergency preparedness 
training. Participants in G1 received additional training tutorials and practice scenarios on 
alarms and hazards. 
 
Once a participant was assigned to a group, his/her training level remained static (either 
low or high) for the rest of the study. The PIFs visibility and complexity, on the other hand, 
were set to different levels to investigate how these PIFs influence each participant. The 
schematic diagram of the experimental design can be found in (Musharraf et al., in press). 
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8. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Conclusions 
Post-accident analysis of disasters like Piper-Alpha shows that offshore emergencies are 
uncertain, dynamic, and stressful. Assistance cannot be reached immediately and successful 
handling of emergencies often depends on the competency of the personnel on board. Both 
individual and team competency are essential. The conventional training programs mostly 
focus on increasing individual competency, as organizing large-scale team exercises is 
often a challenge. The organizational and educational drawbacks of such team exercises 
make them unfeasible. This research proposes the use of artificial intelligent agents to 
enable team training in a VE. Computational models of human behavior are developed in 
this research that can be used to create such intelligent agents. Though similar works have 
been done for the military, aviation, and nuclear power plant industries, no such work is 
available to date for the offshore industries. This research will be first of its kind in the 
context of offshore emergencies. 
 
Both SMEs’ opinion and empirical evidence are used during the development and 
validation phases of the HBM. The first part of the research focuses on understanding 
human behavior by conducting an experiment in a VE. A range of emergency scenarios 
was created in the VE by varying the level of different external PIFs. Influence of these 
external PIFs on human performance was investigated during the study. Internal PIFs of 




experiment. Participants’ knowledge acquisition and inference processes were studied in 
the research. In the second part, understanding from the experimental study was used to 
develop the HBM. A BN approach was used to model the effect of external and internal 
PIFs. Special attention was paid to ensure that the model takes individual differences of 
participants into account while modeling the effect of different PIFs on human 
performance.  The BN models allowed the consideration of dependency among the PIFs 
and associated performance. They also allowed updating prior probabilities with incoming 
new evidence. To model the reasoning processes of participants during emergency 
situations, decision trees were used. The decision trees offer a visual representation of the 
reasoning process, and valuable diagnostic capabilities.  Once the HBM was developed, it 
was used to create agents with varying levels of skill. Three types of agents – naïve, ideal, 
and in-between – were created using the HBM. The third part of the research focused on 
validating the HBM. All high-level tasks of HBM validation were performed with special 
emphasis given on the result validation. Result validation shows that the integrated HBM 
meets the acceptability criteria requirement for all types of agents. 
 
Outcomes of this research may help to advance emergency preparedness training and to 
improve safety. The mathematical models, BNs, and decision trees, developed in this 
research may be used to predict people’s reliability in emergency situations. Diagnostic 
aspects of BN and decision trees may be used to identify the strengths and weakness of 
individuals. Such diagnosis may help design adaptive training to overcome weaknesses and 




different roles. Models like decision trees may be used to assess the efficacy of the training 
curriculum and/or pedagogical approaches. It is expected that a sound training approach 
would result in converging problem-solving strategies that lead to success. Any systemic 
exception might indicate weaknesses in the training approach itself. In addition to 
improving individual training, HBMs developed in this research may be used to facilitate 
team training in a VE. Agents created using the HBM can be used to create a heterogenous 
training environment where trainees can gather experience of working with, or 
commanding, teams with varying skill levels. This may help to keep trainees more focused 
and engaged during the training by providing novel challenges. 
8.2 Technical challenges and recommendations 
A few technical challenges faced during the research and according recommendations are 
presented below: 
• Virtual environments can only provide a certain degree of realism. The work done in 
this research is centered around the virtual environment AVERT. Though AVERT 
represents an offshore oil installation platform with high levels of detail, it can not be 
taken as an exact counterpart to the real world operational environment.  
 
It is not feasible to compare the outcomes achieved in AVERT to outcomes in real 
emergency situations. However, special attention can be paid while designing 
emergency scenarios in VE to make sure they closely represent real life emergencies. 
Facts and findings in the literature and investigation reports of previous accidents can 




• Human behavior and cognition processes are extremely complex, and both the number 
and the magnitude of factors that can influence human performance are very high. 
Using a comprehensive list of PIFs while keeping the number of virtual scenarios 
feasible is challenging. As the number of PIFs and associated magnitudes increase, the 
number of virtual scenarios needed to quantify computational models like BN also 
increase exponentially. 
 
Instead of investigating the effect of all possible PIFs at the same time, it is 
recommended to identify the ones that are vital for a given context. This can help to 
keep the number of scenarios manageable. A fractional factorial design can also be used 
instead of a full factorial one when possible. Use of concepts like Noisy OR may help 
minimize the data requirement for quantifying a BN. 
 
• Blocking nuisance factors that have some effect on the response, but are not of 
particular interest to the experimenter is extremely difficult while conducting 
experiments with humans. As stated above, both the number and the magnitude of 
factors that can influence human performance is very high. It is nearly impossible to 
block all nuisance factors using the available blocking techniques while conducting 
experiments with humans (Montgomery, 2017). For example, in the experiment done 
in this research – three controlled factors training, visibility, and complexity – were of 
interest. However, it was observed during the experiment that some participants’ 




Though the two groups were balanced in terms of their self-reported video gaming 
experience, it was not possible to block the effect of such experience at an individual 
level.     
 
While it may be impossible to block all possible nuisance factors during an experiment, 
it is recommended that sufficient research be done prior to experiment to identify these 
factors. This may allow the investigator to design the experiment in a way so that effects 
of nuisance factors are minimized. Even when elimination or reduction of the effect of 
nuisance factors is not possible, being aware of the factors can help interpret the results 
more accurately. 
 
• Having a meaningful sample size can be challenging while conducting experiments 
with humans. Because this research looked into individual differences, rather than 
group statistics, having a meaningful sample size was even harder. Gathering sufficient 
data for training the models (i.e. BN, decision trees) while keeping the number of 
exposures to virtual scenarios manageable for an individual was a challenge. One 
possible improvement could be to allow the participants more time on the scenarios 
rather than lecture based tutorials. More data points in the training data set can help 
increase the prediction accuracy of the computational models. 
 
• Incorporation of individual differences presents new challenges in the conventional 




different for each individual, quantification of parameterization confidence suggested 
in a conventional validity framework is nearly impossible (Pitchforth & Mengersen, 
2013). Though a validation exercise was not conducted for the BN models developed 
in this research, the models were later integrated into an HBM. The HBM is validated 
with the underlying assumption that the uncertainty involved in the BN is negligible. 
 
• Balancing variation and validation of an HBM is one of the biggest challenges. Due to 
the stochastic nature of the HBM, it is not sufficient to expose the HBM to each scenario 
just one time. The HBM must be tested in the same scenario multiple times. No standard 
guideline is available that defines the number of such exposures. Ritter’s (2011) 
suggestion regarding confidence parameters can be useful when deciding the number 
of required exposures. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the experiments conducted in this research was designed to 
achieve multiple objectives at the same time and as a result there were a few constraints 
that needed to be maintained. For example, Smith (2015) used the collected data to study 
the learning effect of participants across scenarios. This prevented the scenarios to be 
randomized, which would be ideal for this research. Due to the challenges associated with 
experiments with humans (i.e. recruitment, time commitment of participants), it is often 
worth combining multiple research objectives into one experiment. In such cases, it is 





8.3 Future work 
Some guidance on future works that can help advance the offshore emergency training are 
discussed below. 
• An interesting future work would be investigating the effect of the different types of 
agents on human behavior and training efficacy. 
 
• The external PIFs studied in this research were training, visibility, and complexity. 
Though the PIFs satisfied the intended variability encoding in the agents, a more 
relevant and informative set of PIFs would be useful. The AVERT configuration has 
made significant progress since the time of the study and the additional features have 
relaxed the constraints on the choice of PIFs. Future works should take advantage of 
the additional features to design experiments with more realistic PIFs. Moyle et al. 
(2017) has already conducted an experiment in AVERT with such PIFs (complexity, 
stress, and uncertainty), which are more realistic representatives of offshore emergency 
situations. 
 
• Though PIFs like complexity and stress are more realistic, it is hard to define different 
degrees of these PIFs. Objective measurement of whether a virtual scenario is highly 
stressful or not can be challenging. Moreover, what seems to be a stressful situation for 
one, might not be stressful for others. Future works should look into measurable 





• This research focused on the casual dependency among the PIFs and human 
performance. The dependency among the PIFs themselves were not investigated in this 
research. Consideration of such dependency may help improve the accuracy of the 
computational models and should be considered in future research. 
 
• This research demonstrates how BN can be used to improve human reliability 
assessment in offshore emergencies. BNs are just one of the many potential Bayesian 
methods that can improve HRA. Groth et al. (2014) discusses the advantages of 
applying other Bayesian methods and associated computational techniques to facilitate 
HRA with special emphasis given on Bayesian inference. Groth’s work demonstrates 
the use of data collected in a nuclear power plant simulator to update the initial human 
error probability assigned by the experts. Similar work can be done using the data 
collected during this study to improve HRA in offshore oil & gas industries. 
 
• Participants of the experimental study done in this research were naïve. They were not 
employed in the offshore oil and gas industry, and therefore they were not familiar with 
the offshore platform. It is anticipated that data collected from real offshore workers 
may provide different results. Since the goal is to use the models to improve safety in 






• The focus of the research was on the behavioral outcomes of the agents. General aspects 
such as look and feel were out of the scope of this research. These aspects are very 
important for the agents to be realistic enough to facilitate team training in VEs. Future 
works should pay attention to the details of how behaviors of agents are portrayed in 
the VE. Another essential improvement of the agents is their ability to communicate. 
The range of team training scenarios will heavily depend on the sophistication of the 
communication module of the agents. 
 
• This research focused on the behavior of general personnel working on offshore oil and 
gas installations. Since the motivation behind the research is to enable team training in 
VEs, emergency response behavior of other team members needs to be studied and 
modeled as well. This might require looking into the development and use of a shared 
mental model framework, especially while modeling co-operative decision makings 
(i.e. decisions in emergency co-ordination centre).  
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Sample function AlarmInterpretation() and associated equations 
/* 
Represents agent's interpretation of the alarm and PA 




    double CurrentProb = randInt (0,100);  
    double ProbOfFailure = 100*PSF_InterpretAlarm();  
      
    //if agent is interpreting correctly   
    if (CurrentProb >= ProbOfFailure)  
    {  
        if (VisualForAlarm == "Flashing Green" && AudioForAlarm == "Two tone")  
        {    
               PercievedAlarmType = "GPA";     
               FinalDestination = "Muster station";    
        }    
        else if (VisualForAlarm == "Steady Green" && AudioForAlarm == "Constant tone")    
        {    
               PercievedAlarmType = "PAPA";    
               FinalDestination = "Lifeboat station";    
        }    
         PercievedObstructedRoute = ObstructedRoute;  
         PercievedPA = PA;  
    }   
       
    //if agent is making mistake because of the influence of the PSFs  
    else  
    {    
       if (VisualForAlarm == "Flashing Green" && AudioForAlarm == "Two tone")    
       {    
              PercievedAlarmType = "PAPA";    
              FinalDestination = "Lifeboat station";     





        else if (VisualForAlarm == "Steady Green" && AudioForAlarm == "Constant tone")    
        {    
               PercievedAlarmType = "GPA";     
               FinalDestination = "Muster station";     
        } 
       PercievedObstructedRoute = "None";  
       PercievedPA = "None";  
    }  
    if (NewStimuli == "Yes") NewStimuli = "No"; 





Calculates probability of failure for the task Alarm & PA interpretation based on the state of the PSFs. 




    double ProbOfIntFailure = 0.0;   
    if ((AssignedOp.Knowledge.Value == HiMedLow.High) && (AssignedOp.EfficacyOfInformationUse.Value == 
HiMedLow.High))  
ProbOfIntFailure = 0.25;   
    else if ((AssignedOp.Knowledge.Value == HiMedLow.Low) && (AssignedOp.EfficacyOfInformationUse.Value 
== HiMedLow.High))  
ProbOfIntFailure = 0.5;  
    else if ((AssignedOp.Knowledge.Value == HiMedLow.High) && (AssignedOp.EfficacyOfInformationUse.Value 
== HiMedLow.Low))  
ProbOfIntFailure = 0.5;  
    else if ((AssignedOp.Knowledge.Value == HiMedLow.Low) && (AssignedOp.EfficacyOfInformationUse.Value 
== HiMedLow.Low))  
ProbOfIntFailure = 0.95;     













Figure B.2: Schematic diagram of secondary egress route from cabin to mess hall. 
 
 
